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been issued. They attach great importance to the extension of the telephone system to Wilberforce and Kortright, and trust that this will be pushed on without delay.
1. With regard to the question of the fire brigade, the Committee do not recom- mend that it should be allowed to stand over until the new Freetown water-supply scheme has been carried out. By well-organized arrangements for pulling down buildings, storing water in houses, &c., much might be done to insure fires that may break out during au attack being localized to a small area, and to enable such arrange- ments to be made, the Committee strongly urge the immediate formation of an efficient fire brigade.
DEFENCE SCHEME.
1
CHAPTER I.
5. It appears desirable that this Chapter should commence by a definition of the strategic importance of the coaling station, and the reasons for its defence. It might be said that Sierra Leone is situated nearly half-way between Plymouth and the Cape of Good Hope, at a distance of 850 miles from St. Vincent (Cape de Verde Islands), and about 450 miles from the French - defended port of Dakar. Two great British trade routes concentrate at the Cape de Verde Islands: that of the West Coast of Africa, the Cape, and beyond, and that of the south-cast coast of America and the Pacific viâ Cape Horn. In 1891 the value of the British trade procceding by the first route was 72,501,000l., and in the same year the value of the British trade proceeding by the second route was 58,217,000l. Morcover, in 1891 the value of the trade of the Empire passing through the Suez Canal was about 160,000,000%. It may be assumed that in' war time a large amount of this will be diverted to the Cape route, and its protection will thus also devolve on the Cape and West Coast squadrons of Her Majesty's navy. The importance, therefore, of Sierra Leone as a base for the cruisers employed in the protection of this great volume of trade cannot well be over-estimated.
6. Page 8, paragraph 8.-This paragraph is in conformity with paragraph 3 of the Colonial Defence Committee's Remarks No. 150 R. of the 10th December, 1896, on the previous revision of the Sierra Leone Defence Scheme, but since the date of those Remarks the situation in West Africa has considerably developed. The garrisons of the French Colonies on the West Coast of Africa now consist of some 1,100 Euro- peans and 7,000 natives, spread over a very large area.
At Dakar and St. Louis there are some 1,000 European and 2,000 native troops. Dakar is connected with St. Louis by rail, and there are generally French war- and merchant-ships in its harbour. There are five lines of French steamers to West Africa, with steamers of about 2,000 to 3,000 tons gross. Some of these ships touch at Dakar, cither outward or homeward bound, every four or five days, and thus two vessels of 3,000 tons each, and one smaller, would, it is thought, be always available as transports. Senegal, moreover, is now so quiet that 1,500 men might be risked for a sca - raid from Dakar without much fear of disturbances arising in the interior.
But having regard to the great importance to France of her coaling station at Dakar, it is unlikely that, until the decision as to which nation has command of the sea is definitely determined, the loss of Dakar will be risked by the dispatch of garrison troops from that base.
7. Page 8, paragraph 9.-If the above modifications of paragraph 8 are accepted, it would be as well to commence this paragraph with:-
"Supposing, however, that the French should determine to risk Dakar, with a view to the great advantage they could gain by the capture of Sierra Leone.”
8. Page 10, paragraph 14. — The concentration of French troops for a land attack on Sierra Leone stands on a different footing from the despatch of an expedition by sea from Dakar. The French have an efficient land telegraph system in West Africa. Dakar and St. Louis are now connected with Wagadugu in Mossi; another line goes from Konakri to Farana. These lines would much facilitate a concentration of French Senegalese troops on the northern and north-western frontiers of Sierra Leone. The troops available for such concentration might possibly number 2,000 men, and would
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