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Defence Scheme.
8. The present revision of the Defence Scheme shows considerable improvement in the direction indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Colonial Defence Committee's Remarks (No. 141 R), dated the 30th May, 1896, but is not yet entirely satisfactory. According to these paragraphs the scheme should show in full detail the action that would be immediately taken at the station were war to break out with a Maritime Power under the strategic conditions now existing, and which are detailed in Part I. The further dispositions that would be made in the event of a long struggle in which provision might have to be made with a larger garrison against a stronger hostile force than could be brought against the fortress at the outset of hostilities depend so much on the circumstances of the time that they should only be generally indicated in the Defence Scheme and should in no part of it be confused with the dispositions necessary immediately on the outbreak of war. Such confusion is not entirely removed in the present revision and results in a certain extravagance in the scale of preparations proposed to be adopted at such a time. This remark applies more especially to the arrangements with regard to transport and R. E. works embodied in Part III of the Scheme.
PART I.-Strategic Considerations.
9. Page 11, 4th paragraph.-Although the advance of a force by land from the United States may be regarded as extremely improbable, the recent development of the United States' Navy may result in their Atlantic fleet being locally superior to the British North American Squadron until strengthened from England. The scheme of defence should take this into account and should contemplate the employment of its small field force to the best advantage in meeting an attack of a party landed under cover of United States' war ships.
10. Page 12, 3rd paragraph from end. This paragraph is vague and does not accurately reproduce the views of the Colonial Defence Committee as given in paragraph 2 of their Remarks, No. 141 R, according to which with the existing garri- son land attacks should be met by the field force, and the occupation, if the enemy is advancing from the north and west in greatly superior numbers, of the neck of the Halifax Peninsula.
PART II.-Organization.
11. Page 15, Detail of Headquarter Staff.-It will be sufficient if the war appoint- ments of officers are given with reference to those they hold in peace and without naming individual officers.
12. Page 16, Field Force.-No officer is told off to command the field force. As it is formed mainly of four companies of the British Infantry Battalion it would presumably be commanded by the Lieutenant-Colonel of that Battalion.
13. Page 17, Distribution of Imperial Garrison and Militia.-The Committee observe from this Table that in addition to 968 men of the Royal, Halifax Garrison, and Nova Scotia Artillery, 224 infantry soldiers acting as artillery, are told off to work the guns of the defence, while from the Chain of Artillery Command on pp. 56 and 57, it appears that even with a total of 1,192 men altogether 3-10-in. R.M.L., 9-9-in. R.M.L., 7-7-in. R.M.L., and 5-64-pr. R.M.L. guns cannot be manned on mobilization. In view of the strategic conditions set forth on pp. 11 and 12 of the Scheme, the Committee do not attach importance to the guns in question being left without detachments. They understand that the matter of the armament at Halifax is now engaging the attention of the War Office, and that considerable reduction in the number of guns, and therefore of the men required to man them, is likely to be effected. They understand also that the number of Royal Artillery, exclusive of staff and district establishments stationed at Halifax, is to be increased to 14 officers and 450 men. When the armament has been reduced, and the personnel has been increased in the manner proposed, it should be possible to do away with the diversion of infantry from their proper duties to assist in working guns.
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