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A naval raid by either an American or European force might well include the landing of men from a few ships to inflict local damage to the defences, dock, and naval and military establishments, or even to plunder private property; but the force so landed would be too small to risk a march of 14 miles or more across hostile country such as would be involved in an advance on Halifax from Margaret's or Shad's Bay, or by the north end of Bedford Basin. To meet these attacks the present Scheme proposes the occupation with works and small bodies of troops of certain field positions (Kearney's Lake, Governor's Lake, and Shad Bay Road) at a maximum distance of some 43 miles from the main position at the neck of the Halifax Peninsula. The positions appear to be well selected, especially as the broken nature of the country must confine military operations to the roads, but, in view of the size of the available garrison and the far greater probability of it being required at and in the vicinity of the coast works, it seems doubtful whether it is advisable from the outset of operations to expend troops and labour on positions which are only so remotely liable to attack. This remote liability would, it is thought, be amply met in the first instance by a proper system of intelligence by which the field force could be summoned to meet the attack of troops landed at a considerable distance from their objective. It would therefore appear to be for the consideration of the General Officer Commanding whether his detailed dispositions should not be confined to what is necessary for working the permanent defences that have been provided, for fully protecting them and the immediate approaches to them, for holding the neck of the Halifax Peninsula and the North-west Arm position, and for providing a field force to meet emergencies— in fact, to what is shown on the distribution Table at the top of p. 15 and in other corresponding parts of the Scheme. The distribution Table at the bottom of p. 14 and those parts which deal with the disposition against a serious land attack, based on the present available garrison, might, it is thought, be omitted, and in their places the general measures proposed to be adopted in this event should be briefly stated.
3. If the defence with existing forces is not to include the advanced field positions above mentioned, the water supply will lie outside it. In view of the importance of this supply it may probably still be considered advisable by the G.O.C. to occupy at outbreak of war a field post at Chain Lake East and also to provide for the patrolling of the line of pipes by the erection along it of block-houses for small detachments of men. These works should then be included in Section I of the defence. Section III would disappear altogether. In any event it should hardly have been dealt with as a separate section but rather as a position to be occupied at time of attack by troops mainly from the field force.
4. If the G.O.C. concurs in the above views the Halifax Defence Scheme will require considerable and very careful revision in the direction indicated. The modes of meeting various attacks on pp. 8 to 10 and 22 to 26 will require rewriting and may conveniently be dealt with altogether under heading (D) of Part II; the sectional organization will require remodelling; and the "action to be taken by the Staff and Departments" will, in laying down the measures to be undertaken in the first days of mobilization, omit reference to the advanced positions and to all work of preparation against a serious land attack, and will deal with such work in separate paragraphs at the end of each sub- head of Part III in general terms and without reference to the infantry garrison now available. Part IV will also require corresponding modification.
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5. It is observed that in several places in the present Scheme a distinction is drawn between "naval attack and naval raid," the former being taken to mean a serious attack by a considerable naval force which could only operate after the command of the sea had temporarily fallen into the enemy's bands, and the latter the raid of a few ships hastily got together for a sudden attack to inflict damage and produce panic. Such a distinction doubtless exists; the raid, especially by small vessels seeking to damage the dock or shipping in the habour, being by far the more possible contingency. It does not appear, however, that in the case of Halifax any real difference can be made in the arrangements for resisting with the present garrison these two forms
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