2
On war becoming imminent the following moves take place :--
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Strength.
Corps.
From-
To-
Companies.
Officers.
Men.
2
6
214
No. 1 Battalion
Cape Town
..
3
107
"
No. 2
13
428
"
No. 3 No. 4 No. 5
28
864
Natal
""
13
488
"
England
6
244
"
St. Helena. Mauritius.
Cape Town.
23
99
On completion of these moves there will thus be at the stations of the South African command the following force of Imperial infantry:
Stations.
Established Strength.
Corps.
Companies. Officers.
Men,
No. 1 Battalion No. 3
Cape
No. 4 No. 5
""
+∞ +2
16
436
28
864
13
488
6
244
Total
18
63
2,032
Mauritius
No. 1 Battalion No. 2
T 00
1
8
26
a co
3
107
864
Total
9
31
971
:
St. Helena
No. 1 Battalion
3
321
As regards the Cape, it is evident that there may be a considerable interval of time between the departure of the detachments which are sent thence to Mauritius and St. Helena and the arrival of the reinforcements from Natal and England. During this interval the only force of Imperial infantry at the Cape would be:-
No. 1 Battalion
4 companies, 16 officers, 436 men.
The statement of the Governor in his covering letter, that "for an indefinite period, and at the most critical moment, the Cape Peninsula is to be practically denuded of Imperial troops," is therefore no exaggeration. It is obvious that such an arrangement is fraught with extreme danger, and is in no sense one on which we should rely for the protection of our most important coaling station. The question is, how can it be remedied ?
There is only one principle on which it is safe to base the strength and the distribution of the troops to compose the garrisons of our coaling stations. That is, that these stations should be treated like war-ships which always have their full crew on board, and should always have present the full war strength of the garrison considered necessary for their protection. It may not be always possible to carry out this principle in every detail, but it should be adhered to in all essentials. Unless, or until, this is done our coaling stations are in a distinctly insecure position.
The first step, therefore, that should be taken in the present instance is to provide barrack accommodation at the Mauritius for a whole battalion, and to quarter there permanently the battalion which is now divided between this island and the Cape.
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