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for these and all other similar works, such as working parties, tools, &c., should be calculated, with a statement showing whence they are to be obtained, and be recorded in the engineer portion of the Scheme, so that the officer intrusted with the execution of them may find himself in a position to commence work at once.
Under this heading some measures for obstructing roads under certain contingencies would seem to be desirable, especially as land movements are mainly restricted to the roads. For instance, the destruction by a retiring force of the bridge across Lumley Creek, and possibly of that at Congo Town, might greatly hamper an enemy's movements.
5. The necessary medical arrangements have not been touched on, though from the fact that thirty-six carriers are allotted as ambulance and hammock- meu, it is presumed that a Scheme has been worked out. There is no statement of what medical stores are available or of what are required.
6. Again, the transport details require fuller explanation. Table (B) is given as a useful form for summarizing the transport arrangements; it is not intended to take the place of those arrangements, and does not lessen the necessity for going into details. 320 carriers are stated to be required, and their allotment to the various Departments has been determined, but it is not clear whether this number is necessary to meet the ordinary every-day require- ments of the garrison when the defences are mobilized, or whether they are the numbers required in case of its being necessary to form a small mobile column to operate in the vicinity of Sierra Leone. The action to be taken by the Officer in charge of transport should be clearly set forth.
7. Similarly, with regard to the Officer in charge of supplies. Presumably certain special measures will be necessary for feeding the outlying detachments of the right and left wing. These, whatever they are, should be detailed.
8. Again, the Officers in charge of the three different sections of the Defence require to be in possession of instructions as to the area and com- position of their command, and as to their course of action under the different contingencies of attack. All this should be recorded in the Scheme under the heading of "Instructions to Officers Commanding."
9. Passing now to the more general questions of the Scheme, the strategical considerations have been satisfactorily worked out, and the views expressed show a correct appreciation of the most likely forms of attack. It may be remarked, however, with regard to paragraph S, that the 3,000 men forming the garrison of Senegal are very much scattered in ordinary times, and that it would take a considerable time to collect them.
A reference is made at paragraph 10 to the light at Cape Sierra Leone being extinguished. Any interference in war time with lights, buoys, or beacons required for the safe navigation of a port might prove exceedingly injurious to British interests, and is opposed to the principles laid down by the Admiralty in connection with the defence of ports. The main object is to secure safe access to the port at all times to the ships of Her Majesty's Navy and our mercantile marine, and only an attack being imminent would justify interference with aids to navigation.
10. The wisdom of posting a detachment in the outlying position of Lumley Knoll seems questionable. It could not effectively oppose any deter- mined attempt at landing, as an enemy's ships can stand close in to cover the landing, and their fire would render the position untenable. Its occupation increases the dispersion of the garrison, which, without it, is sufficiently scattered in detachments. The position is isolated, and if the force there, which could do little by itself, failed to effect a timely withdrawal and became seriously engaged, it would be liable to draw successive detachments from the main position on the ridge to its assistance. The Committee are thus inclined to the opinion that the troops allotted to Lumley Knoll would be more judiciously employed with the force about Wilberforce, and should not be advanced east of the Lumley Creek. Of this, however, the Officer Commanding Troops, with his superior knowledge of the ground, should be the best judge, and these objections are only pointed out by the Committee for his consideration.
11. The Committee consider that the final measure contemplated in para- praphs 70, 71, 79, 89, of abandoning Tower Hill, disabling the guns in the batteries, and withdrawing to Waterloo, so long as there is a formed body of
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