Printed for the use of the Colonial Office. July 16, 1890.
CONFIDENTIAL.
41-R
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NOVA SCOTIA.
5.
4491.
Amended Scheme of Defence.
HALIFAX.
19
Remarks by the Colonial Defence Committee (No. 2).
THE Colonial Defence Committee have carefully considered the amended scheme of defence of Halifax forwarded by the General Officer Commanding. This amended scheme appears in all respects superior to that previously submitted. The extended line originally proposed to be taken up has been wisely drawn in, and the Departmental schemes have been amplified and improved.
The following are the principal points which, in the opinion of the Committee, call for remark :-
1. The General Officer Commanding appears to somewhat overrate the probable nature of attack, and the Committee desire to draw attention to their Memorandum of the 5th April, 1889, in which they pointed out the great difficulties which would necessarily present themselves to any European Power in carrying out land operations against Halifax. It appears to be considered that a naval attack might be combined with a diversion on the eastern side of the harbour, and an attack by an organized land force of from 1,500 to 2,000 men on the west of the town. Such an operation is, however, impossible without the aid of a small fleet of transports which would have to come from Europe, and cruizers could not cross the Atlantic with "a large detachment of troops on board," or carry the considerable equipment which would be necessary. Moreover, a force of from 1,500 to 2,000 men appears to be altogether inadequate for an attack on Halifax, the garrison of which could, in any event except that of war with the United States, be reinforced to à considerable extent by the Canadian Militia if proper arrangements had been previously concluded. The Colonial Defence Committee consider, therefore, that such hostile operations on shore as appear to be contem- plated by the General Officer Commanding are only practicable on the condition of the presence in these waters of a hostile fleet superior to that of Great Britain. The danger of being cut off on a coast where weather might at any time render re-embarkation difficult or impossible could not be disregarded by any possible enemy. For the same reason, operations at the head of the Bay of Fundy, where the risks of being cut off, independently of those arising from the fogs and the exceptional tides, are necessarily great, appear improbable under all circumstances, and impossible without the presence of a dominant naval force.
2. The Committee understand that no reinforcements would be sent to Halifax from England, and they consider that the General Officer Commanding
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