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aspect of the question of defence. If, before the possibility of this powerful addition of naval strength had arisen, the hostile force which could reasonably be expected to be employed against Australasian ports as long as our navy held the seas was limited to a few cruizers or armed merchant-steamers who might chance to temporarily evade Her Majesty's ships, then, à fortiori, the probabilities of an attack even of this nature may now be heavily discounted.
As regards present conditions, it may be remarked that the present policy of France has taken the direction of a reduction of naval force in Australasian waters.
Under these circumstances the Colonial Defence Committee consider that Major-General Schaw has somewhat overrated the possibilities of hostile action which present themselves to an enemy. They are fully aware that it is possible for cruizers to evade for the moment even the large naval force which will in less than two years be available in Australasian waters, and they entirely concur, therefore, with the opinion that the harbours of New South Wales must be prepared to resist at short notice a naval attack delivered by one or two cruizers." On the other hand, they consider that, under any circumstances short of some disaster having occurred to the British navy, there is no reasonable probability whatever of these ports being called upon to resist attack "by a fleet including some powerful iron-clads, and capable of landing some 2,000 or 3,000 men.' France has at present only one iron-clad abroad, and this on the China Station, where a British iron-clad of superior power is always retained. Russia has now one armoured cruizer, and may shortly have two, on the China Station, but in the absence of an assured coal supply they could scarcely be employed at a distance of 6,000 miles from Vladivostock. Any 'powerful iron-clads" intended to operate in Australasian waters must come from Europe under the greatest difficulties as to coal supply, and it is most improbable that any European Power would dispatch such vessels so far from home waters. It should be remembered that, to provide a landing party of 3,000 men, ten cruizers would be required carrying as many troops as could conveniently be accommodated on board, and prepared, in addition, to place on shore every man from their own crews who could possibly be spared. The operation thus assumes the magnitude of an expedition, while it is incon- ceivable that a naval commander would risk such a force on shore unless he was absolutely guaranteed against all naval interference during a considerable period. Finally, it cannot be admitted that either "New Caledonia or the New Hebrides" (the temporary French occupation of which has now ended) offer sufficient facilities for refitting and making preparations for invasion.' There is no French port nearer than Toulon which would serve for such a purpose.
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The above considerations all point to moderate measures of local defence as being sufficient for all requirements, and the Colonial Defence Committee are strongly of opinion that the Colony of New South Wales should devote its energies to the perfection of an organization which would be available at short notice. A moderate scheme of defence, all the parts of which are ready for action in the event of any emergency, will provide more real security than increased armaments and accessory naval and submarine mine defence.
For these reasons the Colonial Defence Committee consider that the provision of submarine boats is on all accounts to be deprecated. These boats have not so far fulfilled the expectations which have been raised. To maintain them, and to undertake the large amount of experimental work which would be necessary in dealing with a new weapon of war which has not yet proved itself serviceable, will involve requirements which the conditions of the Colony will hardly be able to satisfy. They are costly, and in the opinion of the Colonial Defence Committee they are absolutely unnecessary.
As regards the submarine mine defence, the Committee consider that a small scheme, the carrying out of which can be effected at short notice, will meet all the real needs of the defence. A large mine-field can only be rapidly created where, as at Spezzia, a great permanent force of trained men is always maintained. The Colonial Defence Committee do not, therefore, recommend that the proposed outer defence should be undertaken.
The proposed floating defences, which it will be difficult for the Colony to raise and maintain, may be safely reduced, in the opinion of the Colonial Defence Committee. In place of the gun-boats and guard-boats, an armed
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