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52. Carrier raids into the Black Sea to attack the refineries, oil stocks and port facilities at Batum and Tuapse would provide a useful supplement to the main air attacks on the Caucasus area, and might impose a temporary dispersion on the Russian defences. Surprise would be desirable, to reduce the risk to the carrier from shore-based bombers, and to the comparatively slow F.A.A. aircraft from the Russian fighters.
It would be necessary to assess, in the light of circumstances at the time, whether the risks of such carrier operations were justified. It is only by sustained air operations in the Caucasus area that decisive results can be obtained and a carrier could not remain for prolonged periods inside the Black Sea. Further- more, 90 per cent. of the oil refineries are in the Baku area, which is beyond the range of F.A.A. aircraft operating from the Black Sea.
Land Attack.
53. The Turks are reported to be taking an active interest in Trans- Caucasia, where there are many inhabitants of Turkish origin. If they were at war with Russia, they might undertake operations on land against Batum, especially if the anti-Soviet elements in Armenia and Georgia were to co-operate with them by rebellion and sabotage.
FAR EAST.
Action against Russia in the Far East.
54. It would not be practicable to undertake operations against Russian naval forces based at Vladivostok, other than by submarine patrols, until the attitude of Japan had been clarified, and until some considerable liquidation of our commitments in European waters had released adequate naval forces. naval action in this area would be mainly directed to exercising contraband control for the purpose of cutting off seaborne supplies to Eastern Siberia, and thus adding a further strain to the already over-burdened transportation system. This would also prevent goods reaching Germany via Vladivostok and the Trans- Siberian railway. Lack of suitably placed bases would render the effective exercise of this control difficult.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
55. We summarise our appreciation in the following terms:-
General Factors.
(i) German policy is directed at securing the maximum economic assistance from Russia that the latter will permit. If we became involved in war with Russia we should be indirectly striking at Germany by ensuring that the extent of this assistance is not increased (paragraph 2).
(ii) On the other hand, the extent of this assistance is at present limited by the weakness of the Russian transportation and industrial systems, and is likely to be on a small scale in 1940 (paragraph 6). (iii) Russia is unlikely to risk open hostilities with a major Power. But, if we force them upon her she could undertake limited operations in more than one area, and it would be to the interest both of Germany and of Russia to impose dispersion of effort upon the Allies. Germany might give Russia active assistance in this respect (paragraphs 4, 5 and 7).
(iv) The greatest weakness in the Russian economic system is her dependence upon the oil supplies derived from the Caucasus. We are advised that the interruption of these supplies would in time paralyse the Russian military machine and disorganise Russian national life (paragraph 6).
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