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with the necessary reserves were drawn from the United Kingdom, the result, taken in conjunction with certain operations now under preparation, would be that practically all the home-based medium bombers now available to support the British Air Forces in France in the event of a German offensive through the Low Countries, or for any of our major air plans, would be otherwise employed.
Moreover, recent demands on Our resources of skilled personnel and equipment have already set back, by several weeks at least, the progress of other important developments, such as the completion of the four long-range fighter squadrons for trade protection, the formation of new fighter squadrons to meet new commitments such as the defence of Scapa, the expansion of the bomber force and the re-equipment of existing squadrons with the most modern types. The fact must be faced that the despatch of three more squadrons to the Middle East will inevitably retard these important Home Defence developments still further. Nevertheless, if these disadvantages were accepted, three squadrons of Mark IV Blenheims could be provided from the metropolitan force, and-if the necessary preparations were put in hand at once should be ready to operate from bases in Northern Iraq or Syria by the end of April. This period of preparation could be reduced in the coming months. Any addition to the number of squadrons detailed for the operations, though it would be desirable in relation to the Caucasus plan, would accentuate the disadvantages described above, and could not be effected without further considerable delay.
Some land forces might be required for the protection of aerodromes if we were to operate from Northern Iraq, and this question is now under examination by the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. Until late in 1940, such forces would have to be found either from the three Brigades earmarked for Basra and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields or from other troops in the Middle East. If it proved possible to operate only from aerodromes in Syria or Eastern Anatolia, the French or Turks would presumably provide the necessary protection.
47. The importance of early and effective operations against the oil installations in the Caucasus in the event of war with Russia might well be so great as to justify the inevitable risks involved elsewhere. We have, however, thought it right to set out the censequential effects in some detail. so that a decision may be arrived at with full knowledge of the implications.
48. There is, of course, the possibility that Iran might be engaged as an ally on our side. In this event we should presumably be able to make use of Teheran as an advanced aerodrome. By this means it should be possible, subject to certain technical difficulties which are now being examined, to reach Batum and Baku with the existing Mark I Blenheim squadrons in the Middle East. The advantages of this would be obvious. It is, however, impossible to plan on this basis, since we cannot be certain what the attitude of Iran will be when the time comes.
49. The French have a project for attacking the Caucasus from bases in Syria with long-range bombers drawn from Tunisia. We have not the details of this plan, but the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the Middle East has been instructed to obtain them, and to ensure the necessary co-ordination with our plans.
50. We should point out that the bombing of the oil installations in the Caucasus would certainly involve considerable loss of civilian life. Our existing rules governing air bombardment would, therefore, have to be modified. It is clear, however, that Russia's action in Finland has given ample justification for these operations. The reaction of Germany, which cannot be predicted, must not be lost sight of, since the necessary diversion of forces to the Caucasus would reduce our capacity to strike at Germany.
Naval Action.
51. Naval action in the Black Sea could strike at Russian oil supplies by interrupting the distribution by sea from the ports of Batum and Tuapse, which represents some 5,000,000 tons per annum. The Caspian route and the railway from Baku are believed to be incapable of standing any appreciable increase of oil traffic. Consequently, congestion would be likely to occur in the Baku area. and the transportation system generally would be severely strained. Moreover, control in the Black Sea would stop the export of Russian petroleum to Germany.
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