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20

ANNEX I.

Copy of a letter dated 3rd February, 1940 from the Minister for Co-Ordination of Defence to the Secretary of state for Air.

X X X

Your letter of 2nd February regarding the proposal of the Government of India to commence immediately important operations to occupy the Ahmadzai Salient, and the construction of roads and posts therein. I fully agree that the commencement of not inconsiderable military operations in Waziristan at this moment has, under existing war circumstances, a definite Imperial defence reaction.

It was, of course, never intended, under normal circumstances, that the recommendations in paragraph 73 of the Chatfield report, quoted in the Air Staff Memorandum, should cover anti-Tribal operations on the Western Frontier.

The matter, in so far as the Chatfield report is concerned, is dealt with rather in paragraphs 32 and 47 of that report, which link up the question of the Indian Western Frontier problem with the larger Imperial military

considerations. As your letter and the Air Staff Memorandum imply, it is this aspect of the matter that I agree must be examined by the War Cabinet before India is committed to Frontier operations, which, as the Staff lemorandum points out, are apt to spread into formidable campaigns,

The best preliminary step therefore is, as you suggest, an examination by the Chiefs of Staff of the consequential effects and risks entailed to our war plans of any extensive renewal of military operations in Waziristan at the moment, taking in special considerations the situation vis-a-vis Russia,

I propose, therefore, on receiving the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for War, to whom I have sent a copy of this letter and the Air Staff Memorandum, to instruct the Chiefs of Staff to consider the matter immediately and to report to the War Cabinet.

Meanwhile, as the operations may commence as early as the 8th February, I have suggested to Zetland that authority to commence them should be suspended, pending the War Cabinet's examination with the aid of the Chiefs of Staff Report of the larger problem involved.

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