Page 291
238
conversations held in November last, as a result of which a plan for British and Portuguese collaboration in the event of emergency was drawn up. This provided in effect for joint action to defend the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, and the evacuation of the Portuguese Government to the Islands. Subsidiary conversations also provided for a plan for demolitions on the Portuguese mainland. Substantially, therefore, these conversations should make it possible for us to implement the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and to secure the bases we require in the Portuguese Empire in the event of a German occupation of the Iberian Peninsula. But the successful execution of the plan naturally depends on our keeping the confidence of the Portuguese Government and developing Anglo-Portuguese co-operation in every possible way.
5.
It is quite likely that if Allied forces were to occupy Portuguese Timor in the face of Portuguese objections, the position achieved as a result of the staff conversations would be impaired and our plans in the Atlantic in the event of an occupation of Spain and Portugal would be jeopardised.
6.
It is therefore necessary to decide whether, in the event of a choice having to be made, we prefer the use of Portuguese Timor immediately, or the use of the Portuguese Atlantic Islands and the implementation of the Alliance in the future. Relevant points are:
7.
(a) Whether an attack by the Japanese on Portuguese
Timor is in fact probable in view of the
various alternatives which are open to them, and whether such an attack is imminent;
(b) Whether it is essential to our (and particularly
Australian) security in the Far East to keep the Japanese out of Portuguese Timor, and (c) If so, whether the Dutch and Australian forces
which it is proposed to send there will be adequate for the purpose.
If we can co-operate successfully with the Portuguese in the matter of Portuguese Timor, it will set an important precedent for co-operation in other parts of the Portuguese Empire. If we ride rough shod over the Portuguese in this matter we may not only prejudice future co-operation, but may cause some immediate political reactions in Lisbon which would be unfavourable to our interests in the Iberian Peninsula,
FOREIGN OFFICE,
11th December, 1941.
-2-
Page 291
Page 291
Page 291