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Commander on whom the specific responsibility would rest to comply with the Local Military Commander's request or to show good cause to the contrary. It would, however, be perfectly proper, and, indeed, most desirable, that the Station Commander concerned should receive a copy of any communication addressed by the Local Military Commander to his Group Commander, so that he could at once inform the latter how far he was able to comply without further assistance with the Local Military Commander's requirements.

34. There are two clear advantages in this plan. The executive orders and instructions on all matters relating to an aerodrome would pass from R.A.F. Officer to R.A.F. Officer, and the Group Commander, who has much wider powers and knowledge than the Station Commander, and who is therefore in a better position to co-ordinate the requirements of defence and of air operations, could secure compliance with the Local Military Commander's requirements much more effectively than his subordinate.

35. Should it become necessary for the troops stationed on an aerodrome to be reinforced from outside. the command of the whole operation in the area will be assumed by the Commander of the reinforcing troops as soon as the military situation makes it possible.

36. We are assured and are satisfied that the essential goodwill and assistance of the Army, especially during the transitional period, when consider- able help in training will be required, will be forthcoming to the full extent of their resources.

Time Required for the Change-Over.

37. It is impossible to assess with any degree of accuracy the length of time which would be required to change from the present to the proposed system of aerodrome defence, but the change could be made gradually and without weakening the defences during the transitional period. Over 140 R.A.F. Ground Defence Squadrons and approximately 400 A.A. flights have already been formed, and as some of them have been in existence for at least six months we are of the opinion that it should not be very long before a start could be made to relieve progressively the Army Units now garrisoning aerodromes in the higher priorities. If an early decision to adopt the scheme is given and if the primary work of organising the Corps is pressed on with great vigour by the Staffs concerned, particularly in the Air Ministry, we consider this process might well begin early in January 1942.

38. The two most important factors governing the rate of progress of the change-over will be the speed at which the training of the "Backers-up

can be carried through and the extent to which our requirements in armoured fighting vehicles can be met. Given satisfactory progress, it might be possible to complete the change-over at about 100 Stations by the 1st April, 1942, and to complete the whole process by the end of the summer. We would emphasise that at no time during the transitional period would the defences on aerodromes be weakened as a result of the change from the present to the new organisation.

Recommendations.

39. We therefore recommend that-

(a) An R.A.F. Aerodrome Defence Corps be formed under the executive

and administrative control of the Air Ministry.

(b) During land operations the garrison on an aerodrome, including units of the Corps, should be under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, whose subordinate Commanders should exercise this control directly through Station Commanders.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, should advise the Air Ministry on aerodrome defence policy and be entitled to satisfy himself that his policy is put into effect by the R.A.F.

(d) The order already placed for 1,000 Mark III Beaverettes be met on a high priority, and that an order be placed for a further 500 Armoured Fighting Vehicles to complete the estimated requirements for April 1942.

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