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6.
I have been much concerned about the area covered by the towns in the so-called Brighton group (Brighton, Hove, Shoreham, Portslade, Southwick, Worthing and Littlehampton). The area is one eminently suitable for seaborne attack and the presence in it of large numbers of civilians, however stout-hearted, (and this is not beyond doubt) must inevitably be a serious hindrance to my dispositions. Moreover, the approaches to this area are confined to a few defiles through the Downs and it is essential that movement through them should not be impeded by refugees.
7.
On the civilian side, the problems presented in the transportation and billeting of the 300,000 persons concerned are undoubtedly considerable. I understand that the great majority of these people must be accommodated in the London area, and that at least 260,000 must be put into Central London, I appreciate the serious burden which such an influx would throw on the civil services at a time when London may be subjected to intensive air attack and I do not underestimate the strength of the public criticism which may have to be faced if the estimate on which the operation is carried out is falsified by events. Nevertheless, I am strongly of opinion that for reasons stated above it is a paramount necessity that these towns should be evacuated when invasion is imminent. I put the request forward on purely military grounds but I am convinced that a strong humanitarian case can be made for it.
8,
I request therefore approval to the following
propositions:-
9.
(a)
That the towns of Brighton, Hove, Shorehan, Portslade,
Southwick, Worthing and Littlehampton should be included in the compulsory evacuation scheme on grounds of military necessity, notwithstanding the difficulties advanced by the Civil Departments,
(b) That the compulsory evacuation of all the towns in
the scheme should be begun at zero minus 15 days and should proceed uninterruptedly on the assumption that the movement will be completed by zero minus 5 days.
These plans, if accepted, will take the place of the existing evacuation plans and it will not be possible to put the latter into force, for what they are worth, at the last moment if for any reason the present plan should not be implemented. It is important, therefore, that I should make clear my understanding of the Prime Minister's decision, for upon that the practicability and value of the new plan rests. I understand that zero day will be 30 days after the Chiefs of Staff have reached the conclusion that preparations for invasion are so far advanced that it could be launched at the end of a month; and that authority will be given to put the new plan into operation 15 days from that
zero.
10.
If in the interval the Chiefs of Staff have found reason to alter their view of the date by which invasion is possible, the issue of authority to put the plans in operation would of course take account of the change.
(Sgd.)
A.F. BROOKE.
General,
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces.
G.H.Q., Home Forces,
November, 1941.
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