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5.
From a military point of view these new factors alter the situation but little. The presence of a belligerent United States fleet in Far Eastern waters, with the ability to operate from Manila, might increase the chances of preventing the fall of Hong Kong or at any rate hara sing the attacking forces. Without full knowledge of the part which the U.S.A. will play and the naval strategy she will adopt, we see no reason to alter our opinion that, from a purely military point of view, Hong Kong remains an undesirable commitment.
6.
The question of its demilitarisation is thus largely a political one and in formulating our views we have consulted the Foreign Office.
7.
Immediate demilitarisation of Hong Kong would, we think, have the follo ing effects:-
8.
(a) The show of weakness and the blow to our prestige involved in such a step would have a most
discouraging effect on Chinese resistance, and would encourage Japan to adopt an even more rapid expansionist policy. Moreover by shaking the
faith of the U.3.A. in our determination,
immediate demilitarisation might have an
unfortunate effect on U.S. policy in the Far East, and discourage them from taking a firm line against Japan.
(b) The withdrawal of our garrison would be followed by
the rapid "peaceful penetration" of Hong Kong by the Japanese which might, in the present situation, lead to dangerous incidents in the Colony.
On the other hand the retention of the garrison and our avowed intention of defending our territory:-
9.
(a) Would cause the Japanese to hesitate before attacking
it.
(b) Would encourage the U.3.A. to take a firm line.
gallant defence might be an important factor in bringing them into the war.
Its
In fact the possible loss of prestige due to the fall of Hong Kong in war even with all its attendant horrors would have less serious results than the loss of prestige from its demilitarisation under present conditions.
10. We therefore are firmly of the opinion, with which we understand the Foreign Office are in agreement, that demilitarisation is out of the question at the present time, In the event of war
Hong Kong must be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible.
11.
We would however recommend that all possible help and encouragement be afforded to the administration in remedying the unsatisfactory state of the A.R.P. and fire-fighting arrangements which now exists at Hong Kong,
Cabinet War Room,
19th October, 1940.
(Signed) C.L.N. NEWALL
#f
J.G. DILL
T.S.V. PHILLIFS
(V.C.N.S.)
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