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The principal new factor in the situation is as you will have observed the barter agreement with Italy. Gros says that it was largely due to two things (1) a fear that we were establishing a blockade evidenced by our moving dhows from the Yemen and our refusal to let certain goods such as sugar, flour, sheeting and millet go from Aden and (2) as an appeasement to obtain concessions over armaments to be retained by the garrison remaining in Jibuti, He points out that the agreement is limited to o months and that in return for coal and salt the Italians are giving the following specified foodstuffs, sugar, edible oil flour millet and fresh vegetables and that these are things they spare with difficulty, so that it operates to draw things from them which we do not want them to have. He also told me that if we had any objection to salt the Governor could get out of that and very (corrupt group) said that the French would be delighted if we could destroy the railway near the frontier. There seems to be no way for us to stop the 600 tons or oil going to Italy but it does not seem of very great importance.
Part 2.
I suggest that we might take the following attitude over things asked for by the French and required by us ;
(1) As regards 4 battalions there does not seem to be any immediate reason for changing the decision made if it is still considered important to keep them in Jibuti though we agree here that in the circumstances there is little practical point in keeping them in Jibuti from the point of view of resistance. Gros says that Italian insistence is mainly due to desire for prestige and that they may say nothing if they have to acquiesce in their remaining except perhaps that they will try to squeeze more concessions out of the French.
He says that the French really need them for defence purposes in Indo-China and curiously enough (vide Commander-in-Chief's telegram 1/19569 of 16th September) declare that they want them to go as their morale is suffering owing to a large garrison being kept with nothing to do. He says reasonably enough that 1,700 to 1,800 men fully armed and all their ammunition are better and will have more morale than 6,000 without ammunition reserves, If 4 battalions are kept it seems likely that Italians could press for their disarmament. If this were attempted there would be trouble with Senegalese and Italians might enter on pretext of keeping order. these reasons further consideration is desirable. It may be remarked that stocks of ammunition as revealed in lists submitted to Italian Armistice Commission are stated by responsible authorities to represent 6 hours firing" (sic), This revelation was a great shock to the Italians who accused the French of concealing actual figures. Antoine however confirms that declared figure is correct.
For
(2) The supply question will need examination in detail, but in general I suggest that when reserves in Jibuti have fallen to 2 or three months supply a furer month should be sent. Both Gros and Grey have indicated that Jibuti stock figures are far from accurate, as they have no good system for determination of them and this explains why they have been
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