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2. The movement of the Fleet to Malta must await this strengthening of the A.A. and Air defences. It is, however, a most needful and profoundly advantageous step. I welcome the possibility of even basing light Forces upon Malta, as they immediately increase its security. I understand it is intended they shall sally forth by day and only lie in harbour as a rule at night. It must be observed that a strong ship like the Valiant can far better withstand a hit from a bomb than light craft, and, in addition, she brings a Battery of 20 very high-class A.A. guns. Apart from the stake being higher, it is not seen why, if light Forces can be exposed in Malta Harbour, well-armoured and well-armed ships cannot use it, too. The multiple aerial mine U.P. weapon gives considerable security against dive-bombing.
I should be glad to be more fully informed by the Admiralty about this. Occasional visits by the whole Battle Fleet would be an immense deterrent on hostile attack, and also a threat to the Libyan communications while they lasted.
Let me have the number of A.A. guns now in position, and the whole maximum contents of the new convoy, together with estimated dates for their being mounted.
3. Relations with Vichy.-We cannot accept the position that we must yield to the wishes of Vichy out of fear, lest they make Air raids upon Gibraltar; for there would be no end to that. We must reassert our blockade of the Straits, dealing with vessels whether escorted or unescorted, though without violating Spanish Territorial waters. We should assemble a sufficient force at Gibraltar for this purpose at the earliest date possible. Meanwhile, we must maintain as good a blockade of Dakar as possible, and protect Duala, &c., from a counter-stroke by the French cruisers in Dakar. The conversations with Vichy, if they take place, may reach a modus vivendi, falling somewhat short of these desiderata. Of course, if we could be assured that Vichy, or part of Vichy, were genuinely moving in our direction, we could ease up on them to a very large extent. It seems probable that they will be increasingly inclined to move as we desire, and I personally do not believe that hard pressure from us will prevent this favourable movement. It is becoming more difficult every day for Vichy to lead France into war with us. We must not be too much afraid of checking this process, because the tide in our favour will master and overwhelm the disturbing eddies of the blockade, De Gaulle, and possible sea incidents. I do not believe that any trouble will arise with the French which will prevent the impending movement of our convoy to Malta. The chance is there, but it is remote and must be faced. I agree with the Admiralty suggestion that, if unhappily Vichy should attack Gibraltar again by air, we should reply by attacking not Casablanca, but Vichy itself, or any other place to which that caitiff Government might resort.
4. The greatest prize open to the Bomber Command is the disabling of Bismarck and Tirpitz. If Bismarck could be set back for three or four months, the K.G.V. could go to the Eastern Mediterranean to work up, and could there-
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