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Administrative and Technical arrangements
26. A good deal of ground in regard to the detailed technical aspects of Anglo-American naval, military and air co-operation has already been covered during the recent discussions with the American Observers and their staffs in London. Although primarily concerned with possible American intervention in the European war, much of the ground covered would also be applicable to co- operation in the Far East,
27.
In order to avoid duplication, the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry should inform their own Commanders in the Far East direct of the points already covered. At the same time, we suggest that the American Government should be invited to inform their own representatives on the same lines.
28.
Our representatives at the conversations should be authorised to impart full information to the Americans and Dutch as regards recognition signals and communications, entry into defended ports, minefields, local defences, fuelling facilities, docking, repair facilities, operation of aircraft. etc.
Command.
29. We consider that a unified strategical naval command in the Pacific and Far East, including the waters around the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya, and also Australasia, is desirable. We suggest, therefore, that our own (including the Dominions) and the Dutch naval forces operating in the Far East and the Pacific should be placed under the American naval command, with the exception of purely local defence forces which would remain under the local British and Dutch commanders. This would, of course, require the approval of the Australian and New Zealand Governments. The Indian Ocean would remain a British Command, under the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and we suggest that the Americans and Dutch should be invited to place any of their naval forces operating to the west- ward of the Dutch Islands under British command. The detailed .. definition of the proposed respective naval commands should be con- sidered by the Admiralty, and our representatives at the conversations informed.
30.
No question of the command of Allied land forces is likely to arise with the Americans or the Dutch. Air Units operating from Allied territory other than their own should, we suggest, come under the operational control of the Air Command in which they are operating.
31. We consider that arrangements should be made for the immediate exchange of liaison officers between ourselves, the Americans and the Dutch in the Far East as soon as war breaks out, assuming that the Americans and Dutch intervene. Details of this should be settled during the conversations.
II.
CONVERSATIONS IN LONDON OR WASHINGTON.
32. As we have pointed out in paragraph 2 above, in addition to conversations in the Far East, it will also be necessary to have conversations with the Americans, on a higher plane, in Great Britain and in the United States to discuss the broader implications of the effect of American participation in the war against Germany and Italy in the war on the Far East.
We refer to
33. These conversations will probably range over the general problem of world strategy, covering the war as a whole. them in this Paper only in so far as they will affect the particular issue of American strategy in the Far East.
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