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20.
The primary role of the Dutch naval forces would be to provide local defence in the Netherlands East Indies and in collaboration with other Allied Naval Forces to hold the gateways into the Indian Ocean.
21.
Chinese co-operation in containing Japanese forces may prove an important contribution, and our plans must make provision for stimulating Chinese resistance and maintaining supplies.
Local Defence.
22.
The possibility of a Japanese expedition being despatched against Australasia can be ruled out altogether now that American intervention is at least a strong possibility. If the Japanese think that immediate American intervention is probable, and that the American battlefleet would at once move to the Far East, it would be a rash decision on their part to attempt any seaborne expedition at all. They may well, how- ever, gamble on American indecision and attempt at least the capture of Hong Kong.
23. The defence problem of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies would be very much eased with an American battlefleet in the Far East, although as has been pointed out in the Chiefs of Staff Far East appreciation - Malaya would still be exposed to a heavy scale of land and air attack against which even the arrival of a fleet would only partially guard. Nevertheless, we consider that with an American fleet able to operate from Manila, and even more if Hong Kong were usable, the Japanese position in Indo- China would be precarious, and the threat of attack on Malaya by sea would be very much reduced, and against the Netherlands East Indies would be small once the American fleet had arrived.
24. We assume that the American contribution in a Far Eastern war would be primarily naval (including naval aircraft), but we should hope they would be able to help with shore based aircraft and anti-aircraft units.
25.
It is possible that Japan might launch an expedition against the Netherlands East Indies or British possessions in the Far East as a first move in a Far Eastern war, hoping to achieve a major military success before the arrival of the American fleet. On the other hand Japan may be reluctant to commit herself to large scale distant seaborne expeditions with the American fleet in the offing. The local defence problem until the arrival of this fleet therefore remains fundamentally unchanged. We have already examined this question in some detail, including Anglo-Dutch co-operation, in the Chiefs of Staff Far East Appreciation, and our local Commanders have, in addition, been instructed to draw up a tactical appreciation. We suggest that the Chiefs of Staff appreciation, amplified by the tactical appreciation, should form the basis of the conversations in so far as they are concerned with local defence. The Chiefs of Staff appreciation did not, of course, take into account American intervention, but such modifications as will have to be made will relieve some of the difficulties with which we were faced when first considering the problem.
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