Page 129
Page 129
12.
There are three possible developments which must be envisaged:-
(a) A direct Japanese attack on British territory or an
indirect attack through Thailand.
(b) A Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies. (c) A Japanese attack on the Philippines.
13. In all three cases, there will be two main problems to consider the local defence problem in the area attacked; and the wider strategical problem, which will be mainly a naval question.
14.
In discussing these problems with the Americans and the Dutch, the conversations will have to cover two main questions:-
(a) plans for the strategical employment of the
Allied forces available. .
(b) detailed technical and administrative
arrangements to enable the Allied forces to operate together effectively.
The Strategical Plan.
15. We are not aware of what the American strategical plan
Our own would be in the event of a Far Eastern war. strategical plans, which are based on an exhaustive study of war with Japan, are embodied in the Chiefs of Staff Far Eastern appreciation and the Naval Far Eastern War Memorandum, which we consider should form the basis of our strategical discussions
To implement these plans, with the Americans and the Dutch. however, requires naval forces far beyond our own ability to provide at present.
16. The principal question to be discussed with the Americans is, therefore, how far they would be able to make up our own naval deficit in the Far East, and where they would operate from i.e. from Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila, Guam or Honolulu. In addition we should discuss the extent to which they could remedy our weakness in air power and anti- aircraft units.
-
17. As a general guide, we suggest that the Americans should be invited to take our own Far Eastern War Plan as the basis of their strategy, the United States fleet taking the place of the British fleet in this plan.
18. This plan would, of course, require some modification, as the defence problem must now include the defence of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, as well as our own interests. For this reason, we consider that Manila provided that the local defences are adequate) would be more suitable than Singapore or Honolulu as the main fleet operational base, with Singapore and its greater resources in rear and Hong Kong available as an advanced operational base if required and usable.
With
19. The main offensive against Japan will be economic. In our own plan we have relied on an elaborate system of patrols to cut off trade from North and South America. American intervention this will be unnecessary in the case of North America. The ability of the United States to ensure control at source in South America will have to be cleared up.
C.0.S.(40) 592 (Revise).
*
Ø
Admiralty Memorandum M.00625.
3
Page 129
113
Page 129
Page 129