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defences, we have up to date been able to render it unprofitable for the enemy to attack. Only experience can tell whether the same result could be arrived at at Malta in view of the disadvantages of its position and size as mentioned above. The Admiralty feel, however, that there is a reasonable chance that we could so defend Malta as to make it usable as a fleet base and the advantages of getting the fleet back there are so enormous that they consider the experiment must be tried.
6.
What the scale of defence should be will be a matter for discussion between the Service Departments but in the Admiralty view it might be somewhat as follows:-
Gun defences: Long range guns
Short
1t
11
95
112 (present approved figure)
100 (present approved
figure 60)
Fighter squadrons 6 (present approved figure 4)
7.
The first requirement before the fleet could take action to stop the passage of seaborne supplies from Italy to Libya would be information as to where those supplies are at present passing. Our air reconnaissance from Malta has been on a most limited scale to date and we do not in fact know where the traffic to and from Italy and Libya is passing. We believe that it may be passing across the Sicily-Cape Bon channel by night and thence coasting down the French coast, but we are not yet sure whether this is the case, The first requirement at Malta is to get adequate air reconnaissance established so that we can establish the facts as to where Italian shipping is moving.
8.
Before the defection of France we were confident that supplies.could not pass between Tunisia and Malta as light forces based on Sfax and Malta should be able to stop this and the passage would consequently have to be made somewhere from the Straits of Messina direct to Libya. The Admiralty were confident that if and when a fleet could be based on Malta it should be possible to make such a line of supply too hazardous to maintain.
Without the use of the French coast the naval problem of stopping supplies is much more difficult, but, with adequate forces at Malta and proper reconnaissance, the Admiralty consider that it should be possible to make the passage sufficiently hazardous, though it would be necessary that we should pay no regard to French territorial waters.
9.
The problem is one that may become a matter of the first urgency at any moment, So far the Germans have generally got ahead of us with their offensive measures, and to stop a serious attack on Egypt it is vital that we should interrupt the supply line before it is too late. It is at present the policy that the defences of Malta shall be brought up to the approved scale by next Spring, but in view of the facts mentioned above the Admiralty consider that immediate reconsideration should be given to
come 2 tr
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