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20.
The primary role of the Dutch naval forces would be to provide local defence in the Netherlands East Indies and in collaboration with other llied Naval Forces to hold the gateways into the Indian Ocean.
21. Chinese co-operation in containing Japanese forces may prove an important contribution, and our plans must make provision for stimulating Chinese resistance and maintaining supplies.
Local Defence.
22. The possibility of a Japanese expedition being despatched against Australasia can be ruled out altogether now that American intervention is at least a strong possibility. If the Japanese think that immediate American intervention is probable, and that the American battlefleet would at once move to the Far East, it would be a rash decision on their part to attempt any seaborne expedition at all. They may well, however, gamble on American indecision and attempt at least the capture of Hong Kong.
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23. The defence problem of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies would be very much eased with an American battlefleet in the Far East, although as has been pointed out in the Chiefs of Staff Far East appreciation would still be exposed to a heavy scale of land and air
Malaya attack against which even the arrival of a fleet would only partially guard. Nevertheless, we consider that with an American fleet able to operate from Manila, and even more if Hong Kong were usable, the Japanese position in Indo- China would be precarious, and the threat of attack on Malaya would be very much reduced, and against the Netherlands East Indies would be cualt once the American fleet had arrived.
24.
We assume that the American contribution in a Far Eastern war would be primarily naval (including naval aircraft).
It Is possible that Japan might launch an expedition against the Netherlands East Indies or British possessions in the Far East. as a first move in a Far Eastern war, hoping to achieve a major military success before the arrival of the American fleet. On the other hand Japan may be reluctant to commit herself to large scale distant seaborne expeditions with the American fleet in the offing. The local defence problem until the arrival of this fleet therefore remains fundamentally unchanged. We have already examined this question in some detail, including Anglo-Dutch co-operation, in the Chiefs of Staff Far East appreciation, and our local Commanders have, in addition, been instructed to draw up a tactical appreciation. We suggest that the Chiefs of Staff appreciation, amplified by the tactical appreciation, should form the basis of the conversations in so far as they are concerned with local defence. The Chiefs of Staff appreciation did not, of course, take into account American intervention, but such modifications as will have to be made will relieve some of the difficulties with which we were faced when first considering the problem.
Administrative and Technical arrangements.
26.
A good deal of ground in regard to the detailed technical aspects of Anglo-American naval, military and air co-operation has already been covered during the recent discussions with the American Observers and their staffs in London. Although primarily concerned with possible American intervention in the European war, much of the ground. covered would also be applicable to co-operation in the Far East,
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