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should the Navy fail, on what part of the East Coast the impact will fall. Perhaps there will be several lodgments. Once these are made all troops employed on other parts of the coastal crust will be as useless as those in the Maginot Line. Although fighting on the beaches is favourable to the defence, this advantage cannot be purchased by trying to guard all the beaches. Process must be selective. But if time permits defended sectors may be widened and improved.
2
3.
Every effort should be made to man coast defences with sedentary troops, well-sprinkled with experienced late-war officers. The safety of the country depends on having a large number (now only nine but should soon be fifteen) 'Leopard' brigade-groups which can be directed swiftly, i.e. within four hours to the points of lodgment. Difficulties of landing on beaches are serious, even when invader has reached them; but difficulties of nourishing a lodgment when exposed to heavy attack by land, air and sea are far greater. All therefore depends on rapid, resolute engagement of any landed forces which may slip through the sea-control, This should not be beyond our means provided the field troops are not consumed in beach defences, and are kept in high condition of mobility, crouched and ready to spring.
4.
In the unhappy event of the enemy capturing a port larger formations with artillery will be necessary. There should be four or five good divisions held in general reserve to deal with such an improbable misfortune. The scale of lodgment to be anticipated should be not more than ten thousand men landed at three points simultaneous- ly, say thirty thousand in all. The scale of air attack not more than fifteen thousand landed simultaneously at two or three points in all. The enemy will not have strength to repeat such descents often. It is very doubtful whether air-borne troops can be landed in force by night; by day they should be an easy prey to air attack.
5.
The tank story is somewhat different and it is right to minimise by local cannon and obstacles the landing-places of tanks. The Admiralty should report upon the size, character and speed of potential tank-carrying barges or floats, whether they will be self-propelled or towed and by what craft. As they can hardly go above seven miles an hour they should be detected in summer-time after they have started, and even in fog or haze the R.D.F. stations should give warning while they are still several hours from land. The destroyers issuing from the sally-ports must strike at these with gusto. arrangement of stops and blocks held by local sedentary forces should be steadily developed, and anti-tank squads formed. Our own tank reserve must engage the surviving invader tanks, and no doubt is held in a position which allows swift railing to the attacked area.
5.
The
re
Parachutists, Fifth-Columnists and enemy motor- cyclists who may penetrate or appear in disguise in unexpected places must be left to the home guard, inforced by special squads. Much thought must be given to the trick of wearing British uniform.
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