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6.
To assist the Iraqi Government to maintain internal securi ty throughout Iraq would be beyond the capacity of a single division. The internal security commitment might become a heavy one; in the Iraq Rebellion of 1920 the equivalent of some four divisions was required to restore the situation. Should a similar situation arise in the near future, it is unlikely that any further
It would then reinforcements could be made available. be impossible to operate the overland route, and the division would be restricted to the role given in paragraph 5(ii) above. Reinforcements would be required from India as soon as they could be provided, but this is unlikely to be before the Spring of 1941.
7.
As the Indian Government will remain responsible for the supply and maintenance of all forces sent from India to Iraq, it is desirable that the possible extent of the commitment should be appreciated by the Indian Government at the outset. Plans for reinforcement supply and maintenance can then be made accordingly.
8*
In spite of the danger of entailing a growing commitment, the time has now come to move forces from India into Iraq. Action now may prevent a serious situation; if we do nothing we may be faced with the need of occupying the country in strength later on.
9.
Provided therefore that the Iraqi Government's reactions to the proposals, are favourable, as from consideration of Sir R. Newton's telegram No. 285 dated 22nd June, 1940, we believe they will be, we recommend that the Government of India should now be asked to send one division to Iraq, the first echelon of which (comprising an Infantry Brigade and attached troops) should leave as soon as possible.
(Signed) C.L.N. NEWALL.
Richmond Terrace, S.W.1.
29TH JUNE, 1940.
-3-
DUDLEY POUND.
R.H. HAINING.
V.C.I.G.S.
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