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or likely to be placed can be relied on to prevent large scale attack from motor landing craft on which the defence scheme of the fortress has been based. Nor does he consider minefield, even if co-operation of Dutch could be ensured for its completion would alter the position except to render more difficult and
He considers the retention to delay attack on western ports.
of Alor Star essential for the reception of air reinforcements but can only offer one regular battalion from Penang for the defence of approaches to Alor Star in conjunction with the Air Force and volunteers. Even this renders Penang practically undefended. He recognises the great importance of retaining the whole area of Malaya especially for the reception and operation of air reinforcements but in the circumstances can He only provide volunteers to defend other than the above. recognises that his scheme does not permit of Singapore being able to resist land attack or blockade for more than two months but he prefers this to practical certainty that if garrison of Singapore were reduced a direct attack would succeed while in any case extension of defence would, unless the Air Force can break blockade, only extend the period for a few weeks.
My view is that this dilemma shows most clearly that the present forces must be reinforced if Singapore and Malaya are to be preserved. I agree with the General Officer Commanding's view of results of reducing the strength of the garrison to hold aerodromes in the north if air attacks are not successful in dispensing attack but I also see the following results of the General Officer Commanding's inability
General Officer to defend aerodromes north of south Johore. Commanding's view is that he can only spare forces from Penang as stated to hold Alor Star for a short time. He says that he cannot attempt resistance to enemy landing or subsequent advance anywhere except in Singapore Johore Penang and Alor Star area with anything more than volunteer forces which can only impose slight delay. This means loss or destruction of all facilities for operating our Air Forces outside Singapore and possibly Alor Star if the latter can be held
Air long enough to permit arrival of air reinforcements. assistance then confined to aircraft based on Singapore where they will be exposed to land-based enemy aircraft and cannot long survive. General Officer Commanding's plan will then be reduced to an attempt to hold Singapore with ground forces, enemy being in command of sea and established on the mainland and free to attack with land-based aircraft against which our remaining air forces can offer only brief defence and ground forces nothing. In these circumstances holding Singapore even if practicable can mean no more than preventing the occupation of the island by the enemy. It cannot mean the preservation of naval base as more than an anchorage and that,
I do not I fear, means the loss of Malaya and its rubber. venture to criticise the view of either the General Officer Commanding or the Air Officer Commanding but I am convinced that weaknesses disclosed are so vital that our only hope lies
I also urge that Sir
in strong reinforcements. Shenton Thomas be consulted.
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