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ANNEX.

CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Governor of Sierra Leone to the

Dated 21st June, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

1940.

Received 3.35 a.m. 21st June, 1940.

242

MOST IMMEDIATE.

No. 211 Secret.

Addressed to Secretary of State repeated to Governors of the other West African Colonies, After consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, and the Officer Commanding Troops, I beg leave to make the following submission.

2.

Seriousness of the loss of mineral and agricultural resources of British West Africa and the danger to South Atlantic convoy organisation with all it implies, should enemy gain a footing in French West African Colonies with their important naval and air bases at Casablanca, Dakar, and Conakry, cannot be over estimated.

3. It is our considered opinion that successful defence of this area with its naval and air bases should no longer be regarded as local individual responsibility for any particular colony or base, be it British or French, but collective responsibility of all with a view to complete

If exclusion of the enemy from the whole of West Africa. instant and appropriate action is taken to this end we are convinced that the attainment of this object could be assured,

4, As a first step, it would appear desirable that a senior military officer of a rank not less than that of Major-General should be given command of all British troops and other land forces employed on defence in British West Africa. He and his staff should be specially qualified to treat with military authorities in French colonies.

5. We consider British West African Military Headquarters should be based at Freetown where it would work in closest possible co-operation with the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic.

6. It is our hope, as indicated in my telegram secret of 19th June No. 208 that the French Colonial Governments and navy in West Africa may be induced to fight on in their territories and waters; but if this hope should not materialize and the French Government should issue instructions to the French Colonies to cease resistance, which they would not feel at liberty to disobey, then no one would be in such a good position as the suggested Military Commander to approach the French Commanders generally, with a view to obtaining as many volunteers and as much arms ammunition and equipment as possible. He also would be the best authority to decide on the immediate location of personnel and material so obtained and its future strategic employment. Naval Commander-in-Chief is already in similar position vis a vis the French naval authorities.

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