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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.
SECRET.
C.O.S. (40) 481.
21ST JUNE, 1940.
WAR CABINET.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.
DEFENCE OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN WEST AFRICA.
Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.
226
COPY NO. 37
The object of this paper is to consider how the security of British strategic interests in West Africa may be affected by a collapse of French resistance, and to determine what measures we can take to meet the situation.
2.
We must provide against the possibility that French resistance to German and Italian pressure in French North Africa may break down. During the Summer of 1940, Germany's main effort is likely to be directed against Great Britain; but this would not prevent simultaneous German and Italian action in North Africa. By the Autumn, after we have successfully resisted attack on this country, the Germans are very likely to concentrate their attacks on our sea communications, and their action in North and West Africa is likely to be governed by naval and economic considerations.
3.
German Objectives.
The capture of Freetown by Germany would have a serious effect on our sea communications via the Cape. From the naval point of view, no other objective on the West coast of Africa would be of the same order of importance, though from the economic point of view it might pay Germany to cut off our trade (particularly in palm oil) with Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia by the occupation of these Colonies.
4.
Possible German Methods,
(a)
On the face of it, a sea borne attack on these Colonies would involve great risks for the enemy.
(60) Attack by land forces would be limited by the
distances involved and by the nature of the country to be traversed.
(c)
Attack by the use of air power appears to offer the best results. It might take two forms:
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