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From Militia Reserve-
Artillery Engineers Infantry
Total
229 225 5,771
6,225
(b.) In case of war with Russia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, or America.
1. Adhering to the mobilization scheme-
38 battalions line infantry.
3 companies Royal Engineers.
18 battalions militia infantry.*
3 companies militia engineers.*
9 batteries militia garrison artillery.*
2. Discarding the mobilization scheme-
42 battalions line infantry.
6 garrison batteries Royal Artillery.
8 companies Royal Engineers.
10 battalions militia infantry.+
613
Under present conditions there would not be sufficient troops to supply foreign stations after Malta and Gibraltar had been reinforced, unless the militia volun- teered for the line. The present law does not allow the militia to be sent abroad (except to Malta and Gibraltar), even if they volunteer to go; but there is no reason why the law should not be altered so as to permit of their being sent to such stations as Bern.uda and Halifax (2793–2795).
There would be great difficulty in increasing our army under the present system; we now recruit as much as is possible-at the rate of 20,000 per annum, but with a longer period of service fewer recruits would be required (2792).
In case of invasion, the volunteer force (which is a splendid one) would be available; but it would not be possible to keep volunteers out long for garrison duties, as the whole business of the country would be brought to a standstill (2792).
Assistance from the Indian Army.—When emergen- cies have arisen in China or the Straits Settlements, the assistance of Indian troops has always been cheer- fully given; but such assistance, though it may be depended upon to a moderate extent, must not be relied upon absolutely, as India may not be in a posi- tion to spare troops (2691, 2695, 2696). General Donovan's suggestion to keep at Madras a division always ready for service at Hong Kong or the Straits is quite impracticable (2690).
Assistance from Local Levies.-The number of troops available as reinforcements being so limited, we must look, where possible, to assistance from local auxiliary forces (2681); at the same time, Imperial garrisons should not be reduced for the sake of economy, even if replaced by a larger number of local troops (2708, 2692, 2693).
Before such assistance from local forces could be relied on, it would be necessary to have some definite understanding with the Colonial authorities, both as to their employment in certain emergencies (2684, 2685, 2729), and as to their training to a certain point of efficiency (2685). Local Governments frequently object to paying for assistance from Imperial officers, and to advice which they look upon as interference (2727, 2728, 2731, 2751). In order that good men may be induced to enter the service of Colonial Governments, they should be in the same position as if serving with Imperial troops, so that their interests would not suffer (2731).
At Bermuda, Gibraltar, and Trincomalee no assist- ance could be obtained from local auxiliaries (2681).
Halifax. The Canadian militia are of excellent quality (2683); but the recent proposal of the Dominion Government to raise permanent battalions is hardly practicable, as great expense would be incurred in their training, with the probable result of an article inferior to the Imperial troops they would replace (2708). Halifax is the only Imperial station in North American waters, and a considerable body of troops must always
* Available for Malta and Gibraltar if they volunteer. † Can be employed at Malta and Gibraltar if they volunteer.
[1103]
be kept there one half of the garrison might consist of local troops (2682, 2683, 2706).
Hong Kong.-Assistance to the garrison of Hong Kong might be given by Indian regiments (2688), and a corps, similar to the Ceylon Rifles, which was an ex- cellent regiment, might be raised in Southern India for service at Hong Kong and the Straits (2698-2700). His Royal Highness entirely disagrees with Sir J. Pope Hennessy as to the employment of Chinese as auxiliary troops; in any war with China they would desert us (2688, 2689); but though Chinese should not form part of the garrison, they could be used in certain lower duties (2694). The garrison of Hong Kong should be kept up to a war footing (2692).
Cape of Good Hope.-The Cape garrison is small, even with the proposed increase, and it would require reinforcement on emergency; Imperial interests there are great and necessitate the presence of Imperial troops, but the Colonial interests are such that at least half the garrison should be made up of local troops. It would be well if a larger proportion of auxiliary troops could be supplied, but the Cape Government might object (2701-2707).
Malta.-At Malta an increase of artillery is most important. A very valuable auxiliary force might be formed by increasing the Malta Fencibles, for which a scheme is already before the Colonial Office (2709, 2710).
Vancouver Island.-Vancouver Island, our only naval station on the west coast of America, is of extreme importance (2762, 2770, 2775), and its pos- session may be of great consequence in a European war (2763). The defence of Vancouver Island is difficult on account of its isolation and the conse- quent necessity of keeping the garrison always on alone be depended upon, for the railway, when com- a war footing (2771, 2778). Communication by sea can
pleted, will be liable to interruption in the event of war with the United States, running as it does close to United States' territory (2765-2769, 2771, 2780- 2782). In fact, Vancouver Island is so indefensible that it could not be held in the event of war with the United States or Russia (2772, 2773).
Command.-There must be a rigid rule as to unity of command in war (2730, 2731). In many of the great Colonies local pride and jealousy make them indisposed to submit to external control. It is impossible to have separate action of Imperial and local forces, and there must be a distinct understanding that in time of war the Imperial General Officer shall have supreme com- mand of all forces, under the direction of the Governor (2731, 2743). In peace time local forces might be more or less independent, but under Imperial supervision (2731, 2740). The General Officer commanding should be the Governor's right-hand man for military purposes, communicating with him direct, in case of necessity, but not interfering with local arrangements or expenditure (2737, 2746, 2742, 2744, 2749, 2750); which should be carried out by a local Adjutant- General, acting under the supervision of the General Officer (2731, 2737). At present the local officers at the Cape and Halifax are independent of the Imperial General Officers, and difficulties have arisen in conse- quence (2731-2734, 2754-2756, 2758-2761). The difficulties attending the proposed arrangement should not be insuperable, and no additional expenditure would be incurred. The chief requisite is a dis- tinct status for the General Officer commanding the Imperial troops (2739, 2747, 2748, 2752, 2753, 2757).
Concentration of Troops in West Indies.—The troops in the West Indies (about 2,300) are so disposed over different Colonies that they are looked on more as police than soldiers; they should undoubtedly be con- centrated (2711-2714). Such concentration would be
a great advantage from a military point of view, but would not be popular (2716), and would involve an actual increase of men, as some force would have to be substituted for the troops. On the other hand, there would also be an increase of expense, as Colonies from which troops were withdrawn would cease to pay
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