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Britain would suffer more than any other Power from the cutting of cables. Their safety could not be insured by international agreements (1837-1846, 1912-1915).
March 2, 1880. A. O. HAMMOND, Esq., underwriter, member of the Committee of Lloyd's (1929).
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Effect of War upon Insurance. The effect of war upon insurance would depend upon the naval power of the enemy. War with the United States or with France would cause the greatest alarm, the first on account of the power which the Americans have of injuring us by cruizers, the second on account of the power of the French fleet (1936-1938, 1940–1942). War with Russia would have little effect upon insurances, and might perhaps cause a rise of from to 1 per cent (1943). At the commencement of a maritime war risks would be greatly exaggerated. Premiums would, in consequence, be unreasonably high, but would soon be brought down by competition, which is much keener now than formerly (1950, 1959). War risks are too low even at first, and are kept so low by competition that there are no profits at all (1960-1963). In past times large fortunes were made by under- writers, but there were also many failures (1972, 1973). During the Crimean war insurance was very low. We commanded the seas, and there was little apprehension of Russian privateers (1930-1935). No British ships were captured at sea by the Russians, and war rates proved a profit to underwriters (1952, 1953). During the "Trent" affair, war risks of 4 and 5 per cent. were paid on ships loading in the United States (1988). In the Franco-German war, German vessels on long voyages paid war risks of 4 to 8 guineas per cent. There were several captures at first, and then the German flag disappeared for the time being (1944, 1947, 1964-1966). Underwriters lost heavily on the South American and Franco-German wars (1944, 1954-1958). Very little alarm was caused by the reported fitting out of Russian cruizers in American ports in 1878 (1976).
March 2, 1880.
THOMAS ROBSON, Esq., underwriter and member of Lloyd's (1977, 1978).
War Risks.—Insurance against the risks of war is speculative (2008). In addition to the ordinary con- siderations of ownership and classification, underwriters would be influenced by the nature of the voyage and of the cargo, the power and position of the enemy's fleets or cruizers, and the position of our own (2008, 2011- 2013, 2063). In London there is little competition among underwriters; business usually follows the experience of a few well-known men (2023-2030). A good deal of English insurance is effected in Paris, where it is done cheaper, but war risks are chiefly written in London, as French underwriters dislike them (2042-2044).
Effects of War upon Insurance.-On the first rumour of war, owners and merchants would insure at an almost nominal rate, rather than wait and take the chance of enhanced premiums later (1979, 2007). In war, trade would pass almost entirely into steamers and neutral bottoms but sailing-ships must still be employed in supplying coal to distant stations (1993-1995). Ships either at sea or about to start on the homeward voyage must be insured at any cost, but no sailing- ships or slow steamers would leave on outward voyages (1992, 1996 2050). The war premium on a fast steamer would probably be only two-thirds of the premium on slower steamers (2050, 2052). In the Franco-German war France had a powerful navy, and French merchant-ships did not go much to sea (2033- 2087). German ships on the voyage to India paid a premium of about 3 per cent., and many were captured. Those on the voyage from the West Indies to the Baltic paid 10 guineas per cent.-the highest rate paid during the war (1982, 1984, 1985). French ships were insured at about half these rates (2038, 2041). English ships paid as a precaution about 10s. per cent. to
all ports (1978, 1981). During the "Trent" affair nearly every ship at sea was insured as a measure of precaution, and large profits were made by under- writers (2006). When war with Russia was appre- hended in 1878, the increase of insurance on English ships was from 5s. to 10s. per cent. Steamers from India via the Suez Canal were written as low as 2s. 6d. per cent. Insurance on foreign ships was about the same (2002-2005). A rate of insurance of 10 per cent. would not be prohibitory in the case of a valuable cargo, such as nitrate (1988).
Coaling-stations.-War risks and war premiums would be reduced if there were well supplied and Slow fortified coaling-stations on the trade routes. steamers are dependent upon intermediate stations, and even first-class steamers are liable to accidents (2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2051-2054). Ports of destination should be securely defended (2055, 2056). Coaling-stations are ample as far as the Cape, but defective beyond. Very little coal is kept at Mauritius (2018-2020).
Coal.-Coal is insured at almost double the rate on ordinary cargo. Although contraband, coal must be supplied to distant stations in war time, and would have to be carried in sailing-ships, probably belonging to a neutral State. Australia could supply some coal,
but not to all the distant stations (1996-2001).
February 27 and March 4, 1882. Admiral Sir ASTLEY COOPER KEY, K.C.B., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
Necessity of Coaling-stations.—First-class mercantile steamers which can dispense with intermediate coaling- stations form but a small proportion of the vessels employed in trade (1615). Many second-class steamers can carry coal enough to take them to their desti- nations slowly; but in war time it would be of the greatest importance to make fast passages, and for this purpose coaling-stations would be necessary (1616). Her Majesty's ships cannot dispense with coaling- stations (1617). The efficiency of war-ships depends upon the length of time they can remain at sea, and on their means of coaling quickly (1619). The coal- carrying capacity of war-ships varies much. Ships are now being built with a special view to coal-carrying power. The partly-armoured "Northampton" and "Nelson" carry 1,200 tons of coal, more than 14 per cent. of their displacement (1618). The more coaling- stations we possess, the better (1620, 1697). Many of those in use are in foreign territory, and would be useless to us in war except to the limited extent allowed by neutrals under Treaty (1666). We require additional stations in certain parts of the world, particularly in the China Sea and on the west coast of America (1653, 1703, 1707).
Naval Stations.-Naral stations are of two classes: (1) stations combining refitting establishments and docks with stores of coal; (2) depôts of coal and All stores, including, perhaps, ammunition (1620).
First-class naval stations ought to be protected. stations must be secured from organized attack by sea or land. At second-class stations it will suffice to deny the coal and anchorage to a single hostile vessel or a small squadron (1621). Such a defence would be afforded by a small but strong citadel, mounting a few powerful guns, and commanding the coaling-station and anchorage (1700). Except Malta, Gibral- tar, Bermuda, Halifax, and, perhaps. Bombay, our naval stations are all insufficiently defended (1622). Aden, Hong Kong, Mauritius, Singapore, the Cape of Good Hope, Trincomalee, Esquimalt, and the Falkland Islands all require more thorough defence (1623-1827, 1643, 1662, 1663, 1665, 1707).
Mediterranean.-The defences of Malta and Gibral- tar will, when complete, be quite satisfactory (2081- 2083). Malta is so central and complete as a efit- ting station that another in Cyprus would be super- fluous (2086). The harbour of Famagusta, if im- proved and defended simply as a coaling-station, would be of great value in a war affecting us in the Archipelago and Black Sea (2084-2088).
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