Page 635
Page 635
Tons.
Wheat and wheat flour
3,000,000
Barley, oats, Indian corn, peas,
beans, &c.
3,700,000
600,000
200,000
Dead meat, butter, and cheese Live meat (about)
Total
**
7,500,000 (1566–7).
Eight million tons would be the outside weight, including all kinds of miscellaneous articles.
The amount of shipping necessary for the conveyance of this amount of food would of course vary according to the distance of the source of supply; in the event, for instance, of European supplies being cut off by war, 500,000 tons of first-class steam-shipping, making ten voyages in the year, would probably suffice to bring the whole amount across the North Atlantic (1565, 1566, 1568-1575). A much larger amount of shipping would be required to bring the same supply by long voyages from India for example; and much less to bring it from ports nearer home (1576).
Effect of War.-The immediate first losses caused by war would fall on the United Kingdom, and there would at first be a good deal of suffering and pinching; but eventually the Colonies would be the principal sufferers from the interruption of their trade (1539, 1540).
Sailing-ships and slow steamers would probably dis- appear; but sailing ships only do about quarter of the total carrying trade; and the great demand would tend to increase the number of our first-class steam- fleet (1545, 1554). The chief result of war would be to stimulate the building of fast steamers (1559).
Insurance on British ships would certainly rise, but the British carrying trade could not be stopped in any material degree, as there would be no other means of carrying on trade.
Transfer to Neutral Flag.-The transfer of shipping to a neutral flag, to any large amount, would be very difficult; the amount of money involved is so large that there would not be enough for sudden purchase, and a merely nominal transfer would give rise to many questions with belligerents (1542-1544). The following figures show the relative amount of tonnage of the British Empire, and of the rest of the world, the steam tonnage being multiplied by four, to give an equivalent of efficiency as compared with sailing-vessels :-
British Empire-
Steamers
Sailing-vessels
Tons. 2,300,000 × 4
..
Total
Rest of the world-
Steamers Sailing-vessels
Total
Tons. 9,200,000 4,000,000
13,200,000
1,000,000 × 4 = 4,000,000 7,000,000
11,000,000
..
It is inconceivable that 11,000,000 tons could do their own work, and that of 13,200,000 as well; hence there could not be much transfer of trade to a neutral flag.
Trade of North-West Coast of America.—The trade between the United Kingdom and the north-west coast of America (including Vancouver and San Francisco) is only about 4,000,0007.; the whole trade of the north- west coast probably does not exceed 10,000,0007. (1611-1613).
March 2, 1880. WILLIAM YOUNG, Esq., underwriter, Member of the Committee of Lloyd's.
War Risks.-Since our last great maritime war in 1815, the conditions of trade and insurance have changed; competition has grown keener, and margins of profit small (1810, 1811, 1821, 1824, 1854, 1856, 1916-1919). Opinions as to war risks can now only be bypothetical (1792-1798). Rates of insurance would depend much upon whether our enemy could cope with us at sea, or only harass trade with individual cruizers. The speed of the ship, the nature of the voyage and of the cargo would be taken into consideration (1799, 1800, 1804-1806).
[1103]
605
During the American war there was a panic among underwriters. The war risk on American ships and cargoes was from 4 to 10 per cent. ; the American flag was driven from the sea, many ships were transferred to the Belgian flag, and most of the trade to British vessels (1853, 1857-1862, 1923). London is the cheapest market in the world, but many merchants and ship-owners do business with foreign insurance firms (1905). Insurance would not be affected by the flag, but would be by the nationality of the captain of a ship (1871-1875, 1881-1883). There is no rule as to the rate of insurance that would be fatal to any particular trade (1818). During the Crimean war the premiums were very small after the first panie (1855). In the Franco-German war, German ships remained in port, but German trade went in neutral bottoms (1864, 1865). In the Russo-Turkish war premiums on Russian ships were high, and the Russian flag practi- cally disappeared for the time being (1868).
Effects of War. The first effect of war with a maritime Power would be to paralyze trade (1802, 1836). After the first panic competition would bring down exaggerated rates of insurance (1808-1810); but commerce would pass from sailing-ships and slow steamers to swift steamers, of which the number would probably increase (1801, 1802, 1812, 1813). The enhanced price of goods would to some extent compensate for in- creased rates of insurance (1818). Ships would prefer to risk capture at sea than lie up in unsafe places. Some warning would generally be given to ships to get out of such places.
Transfer to Neutrals.-The greater part of our trade and shipping would be transferred to a neutral flag to avoid high premiums (1819, 1903). Com- merce has no sense of patriotism, and a war rate of 2 or 3 per cent. would induce merchants to seek a neutral flag (1820, 1823). The transfer would pro- bably be nominal (1849), and to a small Power, e.g., Belgium (1827). There could be no transfer of shipping to the American flag under the present restrictive laws (1886, 1887). The transfer of ships and trade to a foreign flag would not injure owners or underwriters, and insurances would continue to be effected in London (1870, 1876, 1884, 1885, 1901). It is extremely doubtful whether trade transferred to a foreign flag would be recovered. Shipping might perhaps be retransferred without great difficulty from a small State (1828, 1829, 1863, 1909-1911, 1922, 1924-1926). Ships colourably transferred would be liable to condemnation by a Prize Court (1850-1852, 1921).
Coal. Coal is always carried slowly, and is there- fore liable to capture. It is supplied to Malta and the East by ordinary steamers bringing back cargo. Regular colliers are chiefly employed in the trade near home (1894-1896). Insurance on coal is higher than on ordinary goods, partly because it is not carried in first-class steamers. The fact that coal is in some cases contraband of war would increase the premiums in war time (1814-1816).
Coaling-stations.-Coal depôts and ports of refuge would in time of war serve to attract hostile cruizers, and would be a source of danger rather than a security to our shipping (1807, 1888). It might, however, be important for our slower steamers, which require intermediate coaling places, that certain stations, such as the Cape, Singapore, and Hong Kong, should be securely defended (1889-1892, 1899-1902). First- class steamers are independent of coaling-stations, and, with some protection at either end of the voyage, would take care of themselves (1807).
Protection of Commerce.-Convoys are obsolete, except perhaps for sailing-vessels or slow steamers supplying coal to distant stations (1893). With these exceptions commerce would want no protection in war time (1831, 1832).
Submarine Cables.-An enemy would certainly cut the submarine cables, which, with few exceptions, are very vulnerable.
Great interruption of trade would follow, but other means of communication would be established, e.g., land lines and swift steamers. Great
7 P
Page 635
320
Page 635
Page 635Page 636