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Appendix No. 9. the distribution of these industries so nearly affects the naval capabilities of each section of the coast,
that even an imperfect detail appeared better than none. UNITED STATES
The condition of the army, navy, dockyards, fortifications, ordnance, &c., has been briefly described, showing that at all points the United States are exceedingly ill-prepared for war, and, from the evidence of the spirit displayed by Congress, it may be fairly assumed that they will continue to remain so.
The short notices of the wealth, population, harbour improvements, are intended as a guide to the most wealthy portions of the coast, and the undefended places of value open to attack.
The numbers of the militia and the maritime population afford some idea of the personnel available for the defence of each section, and the latter detail also indicates the localities where ship-building and trade in timber is carried on, and also the probable centres from whence privateering enterprise may break out.
In the course of the review of the coast-line and its defences, instances of the kind of strategy suitable for the particular area under discussion have been combined with the description.
The writer now proposes to make a few observations on the whole subject.
In the preceding portions of this paper the remarks have been merely illustrative, the bulk of the information, and the expression of opinion, has carried with it the authority of American State papers. In the succeeding remarks, however, unless the ideas of others are actually quoted, the writer is alone responsible for the views enunciated. An expression of these views is only ventured upon, because, in the course of writing the previous paper, and in going over so much of the ground, a certain acquaintance with the subject has necessarily been acquired.
In the "Limits of the Subject," a few words were said of the relative strength of the United States and England, which, perhaps, ought to have been reserved for this place, as we wish to say some- thing in addition.
There is a great difference between mere physical strength and strength increased by practice, and combined with skill in the use of certain weapons. No one denies to America enormous physical strength-not that we acknowledge even that to be greater than England's-but in trained strength there is absolutely no comparison possible between the two countries. This fact, perfectly well known to American specialists, is not realized by the mass of the country, who are ignorantly arrogant about their mere size and sinews. But it would also appear that only a few in England, those who have studied the subject, are free from certain nightmare impressions of the tremendous powers of America.
Americans are very ready to trade on the popular idea of their strength, and quite recently a naval officer, in some negotiations relative to Chiriqui Bay, spoke threateningly of "the slumbering lion. with 500,000 men under arms" but it would be far more logical to compare the States not to a lion or a slumberer, but to a very active, athletic man absorbed in his business, and afraid of nobody, who has forgotten that he lives in a community where duelling is still the practice, and who one day finds himself compelled to fight, possibly a physically weaker man, with the pistol or the small sword, of whose use he is utterly ignorant.
The States have money, men, seamen, iron, coal, timber, but, to all appearances, they will leave themselves without the one thing necessary-time; time to create fortified depôts, to build ships, forge guns, make torpedoes and torpedo-boats, and to acquire the skill to use them, things which are becoming every day more difficult to improvise.
There is another (we believe) delusion to which the Americans cling: they make a sum in propor- tion, and say, if the England of the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries could do so little against the then America, what will she be able to do to-day?
The argument is founded upon an imperfect conception of the whole of the altered conditions. England is, no doubt, relatively weaker, but America is far more vulnerable.
European history affords numerous proofs of the fact that poor and scattered agricultural commu- nities constantly resist for long periods, and often in the end wear out the most powerful adversaries, while highly organized nations, rich in commerce and manufactures, have over and over again succumbed to a few well directed blows from a more warlike opponent. There is no reason whatever to suppose that the American States will prove exempt from the common lot of nations. It took the rich, populous, commercial and manufacturing North years to subdue the poor, thinly-populated, agricultural South; but who doubts that a few weeks, or even days, would have witnessed the triumph of secession if the "Merrimac," unopposed, had appeared off the wealthy, unprotected northern ports.
How long, in the present day, would the prairie States, the South, and California submit to blockade, and total loss of trade, in a quarrel about some remote and problematical interest, provoked by the arrogance of New England politicians? How long would New England itself go on sending privateers against our commerce, when every ship captured would have to be paid for " Alabama "-wise, by the towns from which the privateers went out? The money's worth is there now, in Customs revenues alone, without recourse to any burning or fining.
The helplessness of the United States, in their present condition and temper, is a matter to be marked and inwardly digested, not, of course, to be blurted out, or made the excuse for unnecessary waking-up of the "slumbering lion," but for practical use when necessity arises.
If the two above contentions are sound, we need not trouble ourselves very much with the spasmodic outbreaks of American acquisitiveness, or self-assertion, as long as they are not carried too far.
The United States have guaranteed the neutrality of Columbia; they lately endeavoured to wring from the same Power a very strongly-worded Treaty, conferring extensive rights over the Canal, although they have failed for the moment in acquiring coaling stations at Chiriqui Bay and Carlo Dolce, they have actually deposited coal at Pago Pago, in the Samoan Islands. Some years ago they are said to have been negotiating for the purchase of St. Thomas; quite recently there was a rumour of a cession to them of one of the Peruvian ports, and one of their vessels of war is now actually surveying Samana Bay, which a certain school of politicians are anxious to take possession of
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