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Appendix No. 9.
NETHERLANDS.
On the eastern side-
1. A direct attack upon the seaward batteries might be made by sea; but considering the narrow- ness of the channel, and the inhospitable character of the coast, and distance of any port of refuge for damaged or defeated ships, this would be a risky operation.
2. A landing might be effected at Djettis or Adhiredjo, during the west monsoon, the fleet meanwhile riding outside until admission was gained to the inner harbour by the reduction of Tjilatjap, from the land side.
There are, of course, many variations and combinations of the above four methods.
When Tjilatjap has been mastered, the advance into the interior would take place along any of the lines mentioned under (a), the positions of assailants and defenders being reversed.
It may be asked, what is the necessity of obtaining possession of Tjilatjap at all, when the fleet can ride for three months in the bay, and a landing can be made at Djettis or Adhiredjo, which turns the formidable River Serajo, 300 yards across at its mouth, and when, if necessary, the garrison can be so easily shut in at the narrow exit of the eastern causeway ?
The reply is that the three months of quiet weather on the coast are those of the heavy rains, when little or nothing can be done in the interior; when the fine weather sets in it is difficult or impossible to land, or to keep the sea off the coast. A force committed to this shore, not having Tjilatjap to fall back upon, might find itself without a fleet to retreat to, or unable to re-embark if defeated.
There remains the consideration whether Tjilatjap offers sufficient inducements for an attack on this side on general grounds. It is not at present a great or valuable arsenal, and it is at a considerable distance from the vital points of Java, such as the seat of government, or the centres of military strength. With plenty of time, however, worse places might be selected for a landing than a secure harbour close to well supplied districts.
Setting aside also any question of conquering Java, it might be necessary to attack Tjilatjap, if it should hereafter be made a naval arsenal and base of such a nature as to threaten our commerce in the Indian Ocean—a rôle for which its position, on a long stretching inhospitable coast, peculiarly adapts it.
The above remarks will render intelligible some of the proposals made by Dutch writers for the aggrandisement and defence of Tjilatjap.
In the first place, the creation of all appliances necessary to make it a great naval station :— For the western entrance-
Restoration of the batteries at Banting Mattie.
Stationing of gun boats in the upper Tjilatjap Harbour, to prevent boats making their way
through from the westward.
For Tjilatjap itself-
The existing batteries have been mentioned, and the proposal, partially carried out, to make a second line further in, by batteries on both sides, bringing a cross fire on the channel.
A citadel, with seaward guns, capable of a prolonged defence by 1,000 men. A line of works, eastward of Tjilatjap, where the causeway leaves the marshes.
It appears that to complete the system a line of forts should be erected across the Island of Kambangan; those on the right flank would also command the channel from the western to the eastern harbour.
An important strategic improvement would be the making of a road, not now existing, from Tjilatjap, on the right bank of the Serajo, to Mandirangan, at the junction of the Serajo and Logawa Rivers.
The Defences and Garrisons of the minor Coast Places of Java.
It would carry the present paper far beyond the limits which we propose to assign to it, to enter into a detailed description of the whole of the minor ports of Java, with their harbours or landing- places; the present pages, therefore, only contain a very brief mention of those which have been or are still fortified or garrisoned.
We may preface our account by reminding the reader that, south of the Equator, there is a north- west monsoon, with wet and bad weather, at the end and beginning of the year; a south-east monsoon in the middle of the year. Of the local summer and local winter-the reverse of our own— -little account need be taken, as the difference in temperature is unimportant; the question of rain or dry weather is the chief point. It is, therefore, evident that the north coast is the best to land on for operations, as regards wind and climate; but the anchorage in the north is also better than in the south; and even in the north-west monsoon, when the north is a lee shore, a certain amount of shelter from the swell is obtainable where the shore trends north and south: such bays as Cheribon and Jawana are cases in point.
Of the slowly shelving nature of the shore we have already spoken; there are, however, a few places on the north coast where the hills approach the shore, viz., between Batang and Weleri, in the Pekalongan Samarang districts, and the Japara and Rembang shore. The most suitable landing- places, beyond the great harbours, are near Tagal, Pekalongan, Japara, Rembang.
Anger. Experts do not consider extensive defences necessary here. Although a convenient place for watering in the Sunda Strait, it is believed that a force, aiming at Batavia, would land nearer, and save the marching.
In the 1860 List, Anger is classed as a third class fort- still retained, 1882; Anger is a second class haven (see ante, classification of harbours or havens).
Garrison-Anger shares the Bantam garrison company of 120 men with the fort at Serang. Tjiringan. A harbour at the extreme west end of the great post road; had formerly a fourth class fort, but it is now disclassed. It is classified as a port only for coasters and native ships, and has no regular garrison.
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