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NETHERLANDS.
Banjoe Nappa appears to be about a mile inside Karang Bolong, on the same side of the harbour, Appendix No. 9- and is thus described: "A second battery established on the island more nearly level with the sea- shore is partly excavated and partly raised, entirely closed, and provided with a serviceable reduit. It is likewise secured against surprise, otherwise it would be too exposed owing to its proximity to the sea.
However, the enemy's enterprise in making an attempt on it would be rendered more rash by reason of the greater distance involved in sailing out of the harbour." Against these batteries the enemy, owing to the narrowness of the channel, must sail direct, subject to a raking fire on approaching and after passing.
The writer we are quoting recommends two additional batteries-
s—one on the Tjilatjap spit on the mainland, and a third battery opposite to it on Noesa Kambangan, but says these two desirable works have not yet been begun.
A more recent Dutch writer than the one we have been quoting thus discusses the fortifications of Tjilatjap: "Although the works have been begun some years on account of differences of opinion, which are much to be lamented, they are not yet finished. In 1871 the Minister stated that to the best of his recollection, 'A work had lately been finished which had cost years of labour and a good deal of expense.' There appear to have been considerable differences of opinion as to the value of Tjilatjap as a harbour of refuge, and as to the necessity of works to protect it. The same Minister merely demanded such works as would be able to bar the entrance, in conjunction with torpedoes. In 1873, after considering the matter at home, it was determined to complete the system of defence, but at a less cost than originally intended. With this object in view the gorges of the practically completed coast batteries on the peninsula were to be finished as simply as possible, and the bomb- proof cover was to be restricted to the smallest possible requirements; for this it was calculated that 500,000 guilders would be required. Reckoning a similar sum for the necessary works on the other side of Noesa Kambanghan, a sum of 1,000,000 guilders would be wanted to make Tjilatjap a fortified harbour of refuge for war-ships and merchant-vessels; accordingly, the works on the peninsula were stopped to consider the further course to be pursued. According to Kolonial Verslag,, 1875, a plan had been drawn up for completing the defensive system so as to fulfil the strategical, tactical, and financial requirements; but according to the 'Kolonial Verslag,' 1876: 'further considerations have arisen with regard to the project of completion which has already been sanctioned, and the Govern- ment can see in them no reason for reverting to their former decision. According to the Kolonial Verslag,' 1877: the works were proceeding very slowly, and the further fortification of the position of Tjilatjap is still a point of consideration for the military authorities.'
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Meanwhile, the armament of the coast batteries with 24 centim. Armstrong guns, which were brought from Holland, was to be completed in 1877.”
Summing up the above, there are apparently two old batteries probably improved on Noesa Kambangan. The commencement of the proposed battery or batteries on the Mainland Spit; the third battery on Noesa Kambangan appears not yet to have been undertaken. Up to 1881 there is no classification of new batteries beyond those included in the 1860 Standard List.
Infantry-Garrison battalion, 285 men. Artillery.-17th Company, Fortress.
Garrison.
The nearest considerable garrison to Tjilatjap is the 8th battalion at Kedong Kebo, or Poer- woredjo, 90 miles by the great post road.
[N.B.-There is another Poerworedjo, near Banjoemas.]
There is no railway station at present nearer that 120 miles; no very considerable force could, therefore, reach Tjilatjap by land under at least a week.
General Remarks.
Tjilatjap is discussed by Dutch writers under two aspects:-
(a.) As a final refuge and reduit for a Dutch army retreating before a force landed in the north. (b) As a base of a force landed in the south.
(a) The first case appears rather a hopeless one. The conquest of Java supposes a superiority by sea of the assailant; is it then likely that, after sustaining many defeats, the Dutch would be in a condition to gain Tjilatjap; and supposing they did, would their fleet be strong enough to carry them away, or aid in a favourable capitulation?
It is, however, proposed that the Dutch forces, if defeated in the central hills, should finally fall back on Tjilatjap. If the enemy's advance is by any of the various roads north of the coast range, leading into the Banjoemas Valley, such positions as Poerwokerto, Sokaradja, Poerworedjo (Zittle), would be disputed, and ultimately Banjoemas, on the Serajo, 200 yards wide and unfordable; then the pass through the mountains. If the enemy were moving south of the coast range, then Great Poer- woredjo, Gombong, a road with marshes on the right and hills on the left, would be defended; and finally, Adhiredjo and Tjilatjap itself.
(b) Regarding Tjilatjap as a base for an advance into South Java, the following methods of attacking it may be enumerated :—
On the western side-
1. A landing could be effected near Banting Mattie, where there is a limited anchorage for large ships, and the force could march along the island, taking the defences in reverse. There is a road, but it is apparently only fit for riders.
2. A boat expedition might force its way through the channels from the western into the upper end of the eastern harbour.
This western entrance might also be made the base of an attack against the Preangar districts, leaving Tjilatjap out of the question.
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