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unmarked, and the ground so covered with trees, that in the absence of a good survey any attempt to Appendix No. 4. select a permanent position for defence against an advance of troops would be premature.
VANCOUVER ISLAND,
A force attacking on the east* could disembark at any of the small bays in that direction, that which appears to offer the greatest advantage being Cormorant Bay, directly opposite to and within about 8 miles of the American Island of San Juan. From all these bays good roads lead to the city of Victoria, near to which they pass along the level land that lies between the protruding masses of rock which, while dividing the whole front into a series of small positions of about 1,500 yards extent, Plate III.+ are not large enough to prevent those positions being turned, all the low land being practicable for the movement of troops.
The number of landing-places and the roads leading from them are too great to be defended by permanent works, and therefore the protection of Victoria from the west against a land attack must be left to the garrison and extemporized field-works. All that seems possible is to throw up rough emplace- ments at the most important points as shelter for guns of position.
The peninsula of Esquimalt district might be made very strong against an attack from the east by the construction of a work to command the isthmus, and the formation of batteries to occupy the south Plate V.† bank of Portage Inlet, making use of the latter as a wet ditch. The position is extensive, being nearly 3 miles in length. The Portage Inlet is nearly dry at low water in several parts, but could be easily deepened by dredging. This position could be turned by an enemy passing to the hills on the west
side of the harbour.
A scheme of this magnitude would involve a larger outlay than appears to be intended, and I therefore confine my recommendation, with regard to the artillery for defence against land attack, to the provision of twelve guns of position, 40- and 20-pounders, Armstrong, with their carriages, &c,, adapted to the common harness of the country, so that they could be moved to any position from which a hostile landing or advance could be most successfully opposed.
As, however, a force attempting to disembark could be more effectually encountered on the water than on land, it would be advisable that one or two armour-plated gun-boats for harbour defence should be kept at the station, more especially because the sea-going ships, having a greater extent of coast and water to watch and guard, must necessarily pass the greater part of their time at sea.
The defence against actual assault of the small peninsula on which the dockyard is placed is practicable, as the guns on Signal Hill command the isthmus and road towards Victoria, and there are positions for field-guns for the same purpose, and a narrow position across which field-works could be thrown up in a very short time.
Telegraphic communication from Esquimalt and Victoria to the entrance of the Straits of Fuca and round the coast to the north of the Saanich Peninsula, is of the greatest importance, and should be established at once. A part of the cost of maintenance, &c., would probably be met by allowing the telegraph to be used for messages from the shipping that passes through the straits.
Garrison.
Artillery. The coast occupied by the defensive works is of considerable extent, and is divided by the two harbours, so that it would be impossible to move men rapidly from one flank of the position to the other; there are no special features that would enable the defenders to forecast the object of the attack of the enemy, who, in his ships, could quickly change from one point to another, therefore, it would be necessary that all the batteries should be manned directly notification was received of the approach of a hostile squadron.
There are twenty-six guns in all; and of the detachments required to serve them, not less than one-third of the men should be well practised and skilled gunners; the remainder, and a reserve equal to one-third of the detachments, might consist of half-trained men. The militia do not get sufficient training to be expert gunners. Skilled men must therefore be supplied from the Imperial artillery. The militia and other inhabitants living near the batteries might in a short time be made into effective assistants if any organization existed under which these men could, in peace, be allotted to the various batteries, and there be exercised with the guns and appliances they would be required to use when the batteries are called into action.
Without such practice the same condition must arise at Esquimalt as now exists in Halifax, where, with a large force of militia artillery in the city, many of the powerful guns provided for its defence would, in case of attack, be useless, because the Royal Artillery are numerically inadequate to serve them, while none of the militia artillery have been exercised with the guns, and never having been inside the batteries, are entirely ignorant of the position of the various magazines, &c., and could give but very inefficient aid.
The total number of artillery required to serve the sea batteries at Esquimalt would be:
Battery.
Gun Detachments.
Guns.
Number.
Description.
R.A.
Sangster's Knoll Rodd Point..
Signal Hill Cape Saxe Beacon Hill
Total
General total { Royal Artillery
* Qy. west.
Militia
Reserve Militia.
Militia.
16266
10-inch
7-inch 10-inch
10-inch
10-inch
888
30
18
10
30
30
89288
60
30
36
18
20
10
60
30
60
30
26
118
236
118
118
472
354
+ Not printed.
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