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accordance with the principles laid down in the letter of the Secretary of the Royal Commission. We Appendix No. 4. also think that, unless it can be shown that Port Royal is untenable without including Kingston in the circle of defence, considerable advantages arise from limiting the defence to Port Royal.
8. Without questioning the theoretical possibility of reducing Port Royal from the shores of Kingston Harbour, we think, after a careful examination of the subject, that this could only be effected against the defences we propose to place there by a force large in numbers, possessing a heavy siege train, and practically undisturbed in their operations for a very considerable time, probably to be estimated by months, and such operations are, in our opinion, not only unlikely to be undertaken by any adversary, but also greatly in excess of the nature of attack against which, by the terms of the Royal Commission letter, defences are to be provided, viz., "the attack of a small squadron such as might possibly evade Her Majesty's fleet."
9. Following from this we disregard, as outside the scope of our instructions, all that part of the War Office Memorandum which relates to the defence of the approaches to Kingston from the land side and also that of the outposts.
10. We take, therefore, the two headings given in the letter of the Royal Commission to consider the defence of Port Royal:-
(1.) Under the supposition that it is used as a port of refuge and a refitting station where ships may lie in safety.
(2.) Under the supposition that it is only a depôt at which ships may take in coals and provisions, whilst an enemy would be denied its use.
11. As bearing immediately on the question of the protection necessary for Port Royal, and more particularly on the cost of that protection, it is desirable to consider in the first place what there is to protect.
12. Standing in the path of what may soon be the direct line of communication between the European and American ports, and those on the western sea-board of North and South America, its strategic position cannot be over estimated. As a port of refuge and refit, it is the easiest to reach and the most convenient, but, in presence of a contemplated outlay of a quarter of a million sterling on its defences, we confess to an opinion that its present resources as a refitting port are far out of proportion to so large a sum.
13. The injuries which modern ships-of-war are likely to experience will probably require for their adequate repair a considerable engineering plant, and above all, facilities for docking. Dock there is none at Port Royal, nor indeed for the whole of this important division of the station, is there any dock which would be available, in time of war, nearer than Bermuda, though to send ships to that place would probably prove very inconvenient.
14. It may be doubted on the other hand whether the existing plant in Port Royal Dockyard would be found equal to supply the wants of the considerable squadron which would probably be employed on the division, and in short whether, from this point of view, Port Royal, as it now is, can be properly styled a refitting port.
15. That it might be made so there can be no question. That this has not been done, may possibly indicate that the authorities at home are satisfied with its present condition, but in that case the expenditure of a very large sum in defending it seems a step of doubtful propriety.
16. However that may be, its strategic value (and the necessity that our vessels using it should lie in security therein, evidently places it in the category of ports to which heading No. 1 applies.
17. Considering the question from the standpoint of the Royal Commission, and supposing that our fleet is not strong enough to guard exclusively all our positions of importance, it is necessary to contemplate the possibility of these points being left open to attack. In such a case, without over- looking the assistance to be derived from properly-arranged batteries and fortifications, the general character of such works should be to provide, as is well stated by the Royal Commisssion, against the attack of a small squadron, such as might possibly evade Her Majesty's fleet.
18. A scheme of defence to provide against a regular determined and prolonged attack seems to us entirely at variance with the requirements of our Imperial strategy, as it is obvious that if the enemy had such a command of the sea as would alone enable him to undertake such an attack, he would not waste his time in reducing Port Royal and Kingston, when far greater prizes would be open to him.
19. The whole of the proposals contained in the War Office Memorandum,* err, to our thinking, in this respect. They are too elaborate and complete.
20. As to the question of bombardment, it is well pointed out in the Memorandum, that as far as the security of the shipping in Port Royal Harbour is concerned, this can be gained in great measure by simply withdrawing them to a more distant part of the harbour.
21. The works now in progress for the defence of the harbour, which are of a regular character with concrete emplacements, are styled temporary defences in the War Office Memorandum, but there can be no question, as there stated, that "their armament is far too light," though it may be pointed out that, although virtually condemned, their construction is still being carried on.
22. The idea which seems to govern them is to prevent the forcing of the harbour by a complete system of submarine mines protected by a close fire of 7-inch guns, leaving the security from bombardment to depend on the protection afforded by the outlying reefs.
23. To some extent we are inclined to believe that, with the resources of Port Royal as they now exist, and presuming that our naval supremacy in these seas is not disturbed, a sufficient and satisfac- tory defence would be provided by completing the works in accordance with this idea.
21. At the same time it is impossible to overlook the increased importance which Port Royal will derive from the opening of the Panamá Canal, and its probable development in consequence as a naval arsenal with docks and plant, in which case it would be desirable to extend the range of its defences so as to secure immunity from a possible attempt at bombardment.
* No. 110.
JAMAICA.
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