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Appendix No. 4.
JAMAICA.
5. If in the event of war an enemy should attempt to take possession of Jamaica, this would only occur because of the importance to Great Britain of the Harbour of Kingston and the Naval Station at Port Royal, and the special value which will attach to these places in relation to the Panamá Canal, if that work is constructed.
I have, &c. (Signed)
A. MUSGRAVE.
Inclosure 2 in No. 109.
Sir,
The Local (Jamaica) Committee on Colonial Defences to Governor Sir A. Musgrave.
Kingston, Jamaica, February 9, 1882. We have the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, the accompanying Report on the defence of Port Royal, which we have drawn up in conformity with the instructions contained in the correspondence relating to the subject which has been furnished to us.
We have, &c.
(Signed)
JOHN HACKETT, Colonel, on Staff.
J. R. MANN, Major-General (late Royal Engineers),
Director of Roads and Surveyor-General. H. H. GRENFELL, Commander, R.N.
Inclosure 3 in No. 109.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENCES OF PORT ROYAL.
IN preparing this Report, we have naturally first taken into careful consideration the scheme of defence proposed in the Memorandum* drawn up under the direction of the Inspector-General of Fortifications.
2. We do not, however, consider that the proposals contained in the Memoranda are suitable for adoption, for reasons which will be found throughout this Report.
3. In framing the scheme which we propose as a substitute, we have been guided by the following principles --
(1.) In view of the great range and accuracy of modern guns, advanced works should be placed as near the objective point of attack as is consistent with keeping the attack at such a distance that its bombarding fire will be innocuous.
(2.) The advanced works should be so situated that all of them may take part in the defence of all the approaches over (if possible) the whole ground of approach.
(3.) The fire of the advanced works should be capable of joining in the protection of the submarine defences.
(4.) A satisfactory defence is one in which the maximum amount of protection is given by the smallest number of works and guns.
(5.) A defence is adequate if it fulfils the object in view. In this case the nature of the attack against which defence is to be provided is limited by the conditions given in the letters of the Royal Commission† and that from the War Office,‡ and the defences proposed have been designed in accordance with this limitation.
(6.) In every position, although the number of points on which guns might be placed is probably large, there are a few main points which, if fortified, will realize a satisfactory and adequate defence.
(7.) And, lastly, before permanent and costly fortifications are built, an effort should be made to arrange them so as to meet the probable development of the power of attack due to the progress in guns and armour.
4. The War Office Memorandum embraces three proposals:-
(1.) Defences to deny Port Royal to an enemy.
(2.) Defences to deny the harbour and secure Kingston from bombardment.
(3.) Defences to constitute a secure port of refuge and to secure Kingston from bombardment.
5. We are of opinion that the two latter travel beyond the scope of the instructions contained in Lord Kimberley's Circular letter of the 8th July, 1881,§ and that defined by the Royal Commission in their letter of the 26th July, 1880,† where reference is limited to arrangements for the defence of certain ports, among which Port Royal is named.
6. This limitation seems to us a highly important one. The question is the security of Port Royal as a point of great value in our Imperial strategy, not the defence of Jamaica as an island. If the same, or nearly the same defences which protect Port Royal will serve to protect Kingston as well, they should be arranged with this object in view, and we are of opinion that the defences we propose will effect this in a measure; but it appears from the Memorandum that to completely secure Kingston as there designed would quadruple the first outlay, and would probably increase in the same degree the cost of maintenance- —a proposal, we think, neither within the scope of our instructions, nor needful or desirable in itself.
7. In confining our Report to the defence of Port Royal, we believe we are acting entirely in
* No. 110.
Inclosure 1 in No. 6, Appendix No. 1, First Report.
No. 1, Appendix 1 to First Report.
§ No. 10 in Appendix No. 1, First Report.
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