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THURSDAY ISLAND.
be taken as correct for the present time, there are 700 men employed in the pearl shell and beche-de- Appendix No. 4. mer fisheries, of whom 30 are white men, The coloured men are aboriginals, South Sea Islanders, Malays, with a few Lascars and Chinese, the latter being employed as carpenters, cooks, and servants. Mr. Chester, who formerly served in the Indian navy, and has considered the subject, believes that there would be no difficulty in forming an irregular corps for service afloat and on shore in the event of war, most of the men engaged in the fisheries being, from the nature of their employment, active and hardy.
tingent.
As to reliance being placed on Queensland and the other Australian Colonies, I do not think much Intercolonial con- difficulty would be experienced in obtaining recruits for a paid force; but they would not be of a superior class, owing to the general prosperity of the working classes in Australia. It is also for con- sideration whether these Colonies might not combine to supply a contingent of the defending force. The matter has not as yet been mooted; and I am inclined to the belief that the idea would not be favourably received, because it stands in a totally different category from the question of a joint naval defence for the protection of Australian commerce. It must not be overlooked that it is difficult enough to induce some of the Australian Colonies to maintain sufficient forces for their own protection, without adding to the difficulty by asking them to undertake the burden and responsibility of providing a garrison for Thursday Island, just at the time when they might be heavily pressed to provide for their own local defences.
The great progress that Queensland is making is an important factor in the question, and it is reasonable to anticipate that its Government may in the future recognize the great strategical importance of Thursday Island to the Colony, and be prepared to assist towards its defence in time of
war.
different from other
places.
It is not possible, however, to apply to Thursday Island the same argument as may, with entire Thursday Island justice, be applied to the Australian Colonies, viz., that its defence organization should be self-supporting and self-reliant. The materials and resources are wanting. Whatever decision may be come to, the necessity for establishing the defences of Thursday Island on the most economical scale as regards maintenance must be recognized, as defence preparations in these Colonies will continue to be looked upon as burdens which may at any time be thrown off, in the face of the remote prospect of their ever being called into play. At any rate, should a scheme of defence be sanctioned, steps might at once be taken to establish a small corps from the white residents on Thursday Island, with an organization capable of rapid expansion when war was imminent. The organization should be in the nature of a paid volunteer militia, both for officers and men. It would facilitate the establishment of this corps if seamen, who had served in the Royal Navy, were to be employed at Thursday Island by the Queens- land Governinent.
Having discussed in detail all matters bearing on the defence of Torres Strait and Thursday Conclusions and Island, the nature of the attacks to be apprehended, the defensive measures which should be recommendations
contained in Report, adopted, the means that are available, and the forces required for the scheme of defence proposed, I will recapitulate the several conclusions and recommendations which are contained in this Report.
First, as to the conclusions —
(1.) Thursday Island is of great commercial and strategical importance, and will have to be occupied in time of war in order to keep open Torres Strait, and cover the communication between the west and east coasts of Northern Australia.
war.
(2.) This measure is necessary for the general security of Queensland and her commerce in time of If left undefended, Thursday Island becomes a weak point in the Australian system of defence,
and all communication northwards with the East may at any moment be cut off.
(3.) A coal and provision depôt will have to be established on Thursday Island as a point d'appui for the Imperial navy, and for such auxiliary colonial naval defences as may be organized for the general defence of Australian commerce.
(4.) There are no local means or resources from which a reliable scheme of defence, complete in itself, could be organized and maintained.
(5.) A portion of the forces required for manning such defences as may be provided must for many years be mainly furnished by the Imperial army or navy, or by both combined; but auxiliary forces could be organized from local sources before hostilities commenced, provided an organization for the purpose were established in time of peace.
(6.) The Government officials and others on Thursday Island could be utilized in connection with the defences.
(7.) The defensive measures for repelling attacks by ships as well as landings must be concentrated at Thursday Island, and should be composed of fixed and floating defences.
(8.) The nature of attack to be provided against is that of several cruizers, with possibly an iron- clad, which might appear suddenly with the object of occupying the anchorage or levying a supply of coal and provisions.
(9.) It would be unwise, and endanger the general security of Northern Australia in time of war, if only provision were made for less formidable attacks.
(10.) Fixed and floating defences combined are best suited to the defence requirements.
(11.) Extemporized defences, to be established on the outbreak of war by the Imperial army or navy, are not recommended, nor could they be relied upon. Risk and uncertainty would result from the adoption of extemporized defences.
Secondly, with regard to the proposals and recommendations-
Proposals and recom-
(1.) The defence of Normanby Sound and Thursday Island against naval attacks should be effected mendations.
by the following means :---
(a.) A battery on Thursday Island for six guns, self-defensible, and without barracks.
(b) Three extemporized torpedo-launches.
(e) A harbour defence gun-boat carrying one powerful gun.
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