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the north-west monsoon; at other times during this season the atmosphere is very clear, the smoke of Appendix No. 4. steamers being discerned from the signal station on Goode Island at a distance of 50 miles. On the other hand, in south-east weather (for nine months of the year), although fogs and mists are unknown, there is almost always a constant haze, which renders it difficult to see to a greater distance than 15 to 20 miles.
The points to be noted from the foregoing description, as affecting the plan of defence, are― 1. That the anchorage in Normanby Sound is of great extent.
2. That it can be approached from at least three directions by ships, and from several others by shallow-draught vessels, such as gun-boats and torpedo-boats.
3. That all parts of the Sound could not possibly be rendered secure against attack, even by the most elaborate and costly defences.
Added to this, the general prevalence of fine weather and smooth water renders a landing almost anywhere quite practicable, although such an operation would be difficult and of doubtful value, owing to the woody and impracticable nature of the islands.
THURSDAY ISLAND.
Points to be noted in deciding on defences.
The arguments in favour of occupying Thursday Island and Normanby Sound in time of war Estimate of attack having been discussed, and their physical features described, the next step is to form an estimate of the to which Thursday
Island is exposed. kind of attack to which the place is exposed.
<f
In order to do this, reference must be made to the general defence of the Australian ports and capitals. Having discussed this subject very fully in my Report on King George Sound, I will confine myself to a brief summary of the opinions held by officers who have reported on Australian defences. Sir William Jervois has laid down that there is no probability of an expedition on any extensive scale being dispatched against Australia so long as Great Britain held command of the seas; and Commodore Wilson has observed that were the mother country to lose this command, as a matter of course the Colonies would go too, and the defence required to maintain independence of a foreign Power would necessarily be totally different to what, under present conditions, is required." It is assumed by both these officers that, in the event of Great Britain being engaged in hostilities with any great Maritime Power, a sufficient watch would be kept by the Imperial navy to intercept or follow an expedition directed against Australia.
But there is considerable difference of opinion as to the nature of attack. Commodore Wilson, Commodore Wilson' whilst urging strongly the establishment of a fortified coal depôt at Thursday Island, does not believe opinion. it would be practicable for iron-clads to make the journey to Australia. He bases his argument on the coal vitality of ships of war, and, whilst admitting the possibility, he doubts the probability, of a squadron of fast frigates escaping the vigilance of our fleet and cruizers. He considers that the class of vessels to be expected in time of war, and which the Colonies should be prepared to meet, are armed merchant-vessels, possessing great speed and coal vitality-such vessels, if well commanded, might do incalculable damage both to shipping and exposed ports; they could more easily evade the watchful eye of British cruizers and Consuls abroad, and, from their coal capacity, could be fitted out at remote ports and pass unobserved, disguised as traders, over half the world.
Admiral Hoskins, R.N., although doubtful as to the practicability of iron-clads attacking Australia, Admiral Hoskins' believes in the possibility of a sudden raid by a flying squadron capable of landing a force of about opinion. 1,500 men.
Again, Sir W. Jervois thinks that the enemy might dispatch several cruizers to make a descent Sir W. Jervois' upon Australia, or operate against her commerce. A squadron intended for such an operation might opinion. consist of three or four vessels, one or two of which would probably be iron-clads. Eluding the British ships, and appearing suddenly before one of the Australian ports, it might capture the merchant-vessels lying in it; or it might occupy a harbour with a view to ulterior operations.
I am altogether opposed to Commodore Wilson's conclusions, although I admit the force of some Scale on which of his arguments. In my opinion, the defences provided for the Australian Colonies generally, and for defences should be the protection of coal depôts, should be on such a scale as to meet the more formidable attacks con-
provided. templated by Sir W. Jervois, Admiral Hoskins, and myself. Commodore Wilson is also a strong advocate for extemporized defences, because he believes the expenditure for permanent defences will not be sanctioned. For coal depôts generally he suggests that the sites for batteries should be selected -guns, ammunition, and stores being kept ready and on the outbreak of war he would construct temporary batteries and send detachments of marines to garrison the works.
Admiral Hoskins insists upon the necessity of fortifying all important points in Australia, in order that the navy may be free to operate at sea in the best manner possible for the general defence of the Colonies. In his opinion, the Imperial squadron could not undertake the defence of any Australian port.
With every desire to exercise the strictest economy, I must reject Commodore Wilson's sug- gestions, as they would admit of uncertainty and risk in the defence preparations, and thus the very object for which these preparations are made would be defeated. In the case of Thursday Island, the fact that the place is so isolated, and yet occupies such an important position, is an additional reason for establishing defences on a proper scale. To follow any other course would be extremely unwise. Moreover, the argument as to the coal vitality of the attacking ships does not apply with the same force to Thursday Island, on account of its geographical position.
It should be noted that the scheme of defence proposed in the War Office Memorandum of the 17th May, 1881,* which will be further considered hereafter, is generally in accordance with my views.
Next, as to the probable modes of attack that could be adopted by an enemy-
Probable modes of
1. He may keep away from Normanby Sound, and merely watch the channels through Torres attack to be expected. Strait, with a view to preventing any vessels from passing through.
2. He may force an entrance into Normanby Sound for the purpose of obtaining coal and destroying the Settlement.
[1103]
* No. 106.
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