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pelago) by the British Government, as recommended by Sir Harry Parkes, Her Majesty's Minister at Yedo, and by Vice-Admiral Ryder.
1. In reply, I request that you will inform my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that my opinion on this proposal, which they request me to give them, is as follows:-
I have long thought that it would be very greatly to the advantage of British interests if we held some possession of our own in the eastern seas lying near the north of China and near Japan, and so far back as the beginning of 1860, on my return to England from the command of the
Highflyer" in China, I represented this verbally at the Admiralty as a very desirable measure.
2. The reasons which were in existence at that period in recommendation of such a step have been fully confirmed by subsequent experience, and have received greatly augmented weight by the progress of events since, especially recently.
Russia has of late years gained a large accession of territory extending down the whole coast of Manchuria, from the mouth of the Amur to the southward of Possiette, while on the other side of the Gulf of Tartary, having elbowed the Japanese out, she has recently acquired possession of the whole of Saghalien, a valuable island, rich in the possession of extensive coal-fields.
The Gulf of Tartary, lying between Manchuria and Saghalien, becomes henceforth virtually a Russian lake.
3. Japan has greatly increased in power and importance, and is evidently ambitious of distin- guishing herself in the politics of the Far East.
China is again showing symptoms of unfriendliness, forgetful of her weakness, and of the hostile occupation of Peking by hated foreigners in 1860.
Troubles appear to be impending between Corea and Japan, of which, should they culminate in a rupture, Russia will surely not fail to take advantage, using Japan as her cat's-paw.
The ill-feeling between China and Japan, produced by the affair of Formosa last year (1874), is probably only half smoothed over; the jealousy of China and the ambition of Japan may at any time reopen this, or other question of dispute, and produce a rupture between the two countries.
4. In the face of these facts and probabilities, it is time that Great Britain were on the alert to protect her interests, present and prospective.
As truly pointed out by Admiral Ryder, our small dockyard establishment at Shanghae, the only possession we have north of Hong Kong, would be of little or no use to us in time of war, except (paradoxical as it may seem) we were at war with China herself, when, if allowed to follow the precedents of 1857-60, while fighting against the Chinese Government in the north, we should continue to peacefully trade with them at Shanghae, and the other ports in the south, localizing the war, viewing it as an affair between the Governments, and not as a quarrel with the people.
5. If at war with any other nation, China being neutral, it is probable that objection might be taken to our using our establishment at Shanghae, where we keep our depôt of coals and stores, as compromising the neutrality of the Chinese, and pressure might be put on them not to permit it.
Hence it is of great importance that we should hold a place of our own in these seas adjacent to China and Japan, where we could establish our naval head-quarters.
Port Hamilton possesses all the requisite qualifications for our purposes, and I fully agree with Sir Harry Parkes and Admiral Ryder in thinking it highly desirable that possession should be taken of it forthwith.
If we do not, some other Power, less scrupulous, will in all probability do so, and our chance will be lost.
6. Of the European Powers, the one most likely to object is Russia. Should she do so, let her be reminded of Manchuria and Saghalien.
Germany is said to be in contemplation of a similar proceeding, and, therefore, cannot object.
If France demurs, remind her of her acquisitions in Cochin-China, and of her increasing protecto- rate over the northern States.
The United States take little interest in foreign questions, and are not likely to be objective. China would probably be too inert to raise any difficulty.
There only remains Japan to be considered. Perhaps, instigated by Russia, she might object; but,
in view of her own supposed designs, her objections could easily be overruled.
In conclusion, I trust that Her Majesty's Government may see fit to view the matter in this light, and may be induced to order possession to be taken of Port Hamilton forthwith accordingly, before it is too late.
Appendix No. 4.
Poaт HAMILTON.
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I have, &c. (Signed)
CHAS. P. SHADWELL.
Sir,
Inclosure 30 in No. 104.
Admiralty to Foreign Office.
Admiralty, October 14, 1875.
WITH reference to your letter of the 5th instant,* on the subject of the proposed occupation by the British Government of the group of islands known as Port Hamilton, in the Archipelago of the Corea, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward, for the infor- mation of the Earl of Derby, the copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir C. Shadwell,† communicating his views on this matter.
* Inclosure 27.
+ Inclosure 29.
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