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Inclosure 14 in No. 74.
Defences of Singapore.
(Secret.)
HIS Excellency the Governor having laid before the Committee the Report of Lieutenant McCallum, R.E.,* on the further defence of Singapore, I having studied it, and also his Excellency's Memorandum,f beg to lay before the Committee a few points on which I am not of the same opinion as expressed in the Report, and at the same time bearing in mind paragraph 7 of his Excellency's Memo- randum, wish to raise a discussion before the Committee on the expediency of reducing the proposed number of batteries.
2. In paragraph 16, Captain McCallum, R.E., lays down six heads, and passing over the first three heads without remark, I turn to the fourth, which treats with the further defence of Singapore.
3. With regard to the western entrance of the New Harbour (paragraphs 60 and 61), I quite agree with the Report that the defence is weak, but at the same time I would suggest that the The modifications of the Mount battery at Passir Panjang be made stronger than Mount Siloso.
Siloso battery, suggested in paragraphs 68 and 69, have the disadvantage which is inherent in the battery, namely, that the guns in firing into a ship entering the harbour, fire over one another, and the new proposed 9-inch guns in the battery would be fired over by the two 64-pounders, and by the proposed 7-inch guns in the salient of the redan; shells also just clearing one gun would do damage to another.
4. I would, therefore, suggest that no extra guns be placed in the Siloso battery, and that the lower 64-pounder gun, which is a very weak gun from its position and from slips in the battery, be removed and placed in the salient of the proposed redan so as to bring a fire on Mount Imbeah and the harbour.
5. With regard to paragraphs 71 and 72, I think the present magazine under the lower 64-pounder might be converted into what is required.
6. In paragraph 73, barracks on Mount Imbeah are proposed. I would certainly not have the barracks separate from the battery, but trust to the two guns of Siloso, the two guns at Passir Panjang and the commanding Mount Faber range to put down any attempt to hold Mount Imbeah.
7. As regards (paragraphs 74 and 75) the Blakang Mati South proposed battery. I consider that the point gained by it to be quite inadequate to the cost of such an isolated battery. With a mangrove swamp between it and Blakang Mati East it would be unable to receive direct help if attacked, and could be silenced by direct fire from a ship anchored under Pulo Sekookur or off Siliger Shoal, and would be unassisted by either Blakang Mati East or Mount Siloso. The silencing position mentioned in paragraphs 48 and 53 is a very difficult one to do harm to Mount Siloso, and then only as regards the guns which fire along the shore to prevent landing, while the raising of the gorge of Blakang Mati East would make it almost impossible to do any harm to the guns in that battery. It would be far better to place one rifled howitzer in Blakang Mati and one in Siloso, so that these batteries could return the long range fire, which would then be in favour of the shore batteries, as no iron-clad would care to run the chance of silencing guns situated 140 feet and 170 feet above, and 2,000 to 3,000 yards distance, with the risk of an 8-inch shell dropping through the decks.
8. I agree with the remarks regarding the strengthening of Blakang Mati East (paragraphs 76, 77, 78, 79, and 80), with the exception of the small proposed closed work, which should be abandoned, and the work made complete in itself.
9. The gorge should be raised and strengthened so that no fire from the other side of the island could take the guns in reverse.
10. With regard to Mount Serapong redoubt, I would certainly have it made unassailable, but I doubt the advantage of 13-inch mortars in such a position.
11. I consider that with the proposed alteration in Blakang Mati East and Siloso, and with Mount Serapong armed with three field-pieces, no landing could be made on Blakang Mati, which could even materially injure the coal stores.
12. Even if, after landing on the cliff at Blakang Mati South, and an advance across the swamp under the fire of Blakang Mati East and the redoubt, the redoubt were taken with severe fighting, the enemy would find themselves in possession of a height 2,000 yards distant from the coal stores, and the guns
of Blakang Mati East firing over the entrance would still be safe and defiladed from their musketry fire.
13. An attack to gain the undefended position on Mount Imbeah would be only more hazardous, and any position held would be commanded by the Mount Faber Range, 2,000 yards distant, and at the same time four guns-two from Passir Panjang, and two from Siloso-could be brought to bear on it, and even then, only a small portion of the coal stores would be within 3,000 yards of the captured position, while the defence of the western entrance would not be weakened as the guns are not com- manded by Mount Imbeah.
14. I would, therefore, for the above reasons, confine the defence of Blakang Mati to Mount Siloso with five guns, Blakang Mati East with seven guns, and Mount Serapong redoubt with three field pieces for I consider with these defences the occupation of Mount Serapong and Mount Imbeah to be a very difficult undertaking, and the defence against the direct attack of the entrances by vessels, not impaired, unless heavy guns be brought into those positions, which would not be possible in the time available to the enemy.
15. Having now dealt with the defence against an attack on the Blakang Mati side of the New Harbour, I would suggest what should be done on the Island of Singapore itself, believing that the batteries on the main island can be more readily supported, and therefore better defended. On this
[1103]
*Inclosure 15 in No. 74.
Inclosure 16 in No. 74.
3 Q
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Appendix No. 4.
SINGAPORE.
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