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Appendix No. 4.
SINGAPORE.
Commander John- stone's Report.
Individual charac- teristic opinions.
"Ships versus Forts" an erroneous idea.
General result of dis- cussions.
Rigidity of platform.
Command.
Batteries à fleur d'eau.
Sinkability.
(Confidential.)
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Inclosure 12 in No. 74.
Floating Defences for Singapore.
IT is with some interest that I have read the paper which Commander Johnstone has laid before the Committee relative to the necessity of floating defences for the protection of Singapore, as, although I have often discussed the question with Naval Officers, this is the first distinct-proposition which I have seen on paper.
2. It is generally to be found in a mixed Committee composed such as ours is, that the attention of each individual member is especially directed to the consideration of how the medium of defence with which he is particularly familiar can be most advantageously called into play, to the exclusion of the broader consideration of the best possible combined system of fixed, floating, and submarine defences which will unite economy of force, maintenance, and original outlay, with efficiency of purpose and certainty of action.
3. The expression of such individual opinion gives rise to an erroneous idea that there are really two schools of defence advocates whose controversy is defined by the text "Ships versus Forts." " versus
This
is a veritable misnomer. Forts have their places and ships have theirs. In some cases defence measures can be adopted by forts alone; in others, circumstances require that forts shall altogether give place to floating means of defence; whilst a third class of places requires that floating means of defence shall be employed in conjunction with shore batteries.
4. It is only as regards the scope which should be given to floating batteries that partizanship is displayed. The general result of frequent discussions on the subject, in Committee and out of Com- mittee, and the opinion of the leading authorities of the day is that, if there be a land position from which a fire can he brought to bear on the zone which it is proposed to defend, preference should be given to such a position over any means of carrying guns afloat.
Proposed Headings of this Memorandum.
5. In my absence from Singapore, I may perhaps be allowed briefly (a) to remind the Committee of a few reasons which have supported this view of the matter. I will then (b) consider how far the topographical and hydrographical features of Singapore favour or otherwise the proposed system of land defence, and finally I will (c) analyse Commander Johnstone's paper, and state in what particulars I agree with, or differ from, him.
(a.)
6. Forts have the great advantage of a fixed, steady platform, whilst ships are in perpetual motion. Naval gunnery is thus heavily handicapped, not from want of care and training, as those who havə seen the firing from the "Excellent" at Portsmouth can testify, but from a circumstance over which there is no control, viz., the non-rigidity of water and the constant changes of plane of inclination of a vessel's deck. Thus, as a result of the experiments by the "Monarch," "Captain," and "Hercules,” off Vigo in 1870, Captain Colomb, R.N., in a lecture at the Royal United Service Institution in April 1871, arrived at the conclusion that each of the 25-ton guns of the "Monarch" at 1,000 yards would only hit a target, 300 feet long by 15 feet high, once in 10 rounds. In the engagement in 1877 between the "Shah" and "Amethyst,” and “ 'Huascar," our vessels fired 431 rounds and only hulled the "Huascar" nine times, whilst the "Huascar" did not touch us at all.
7. The next advantage which forts have over ships is to be found in the height at which the guns can be mounted, and the facilities so often presented as at batteries Mount Siloso and Mount Palmer -for catching projectiles falling short. This advantage I have alluded to in paragraph 40 of my Report,* and, in connection with the example given of the 17th October, 1854, may add that the four ships concerned formed part of the "
" inshore squadron of six ships in all, carrying 238 guns on a broadside; that they were directly opposed to 12 guns only in open batteries—a proportion of 1 to 18, and that on being beaten off, the "Albion," 90, and “Arethusa,” 50, were found to be so disabled that they had to proceed to Constantinople to refit.
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8. So well known is this advantage of command, that the Engineer's first thoughts are directed to the selection of positions which, whilst giving the guns a proper height above those carried on ship-board, do not make the fire too plunging. He will never, of choice, take up a position such as that at Tanjong Katong where his battery must be à fleur d'eau with its many attendant disadvantages. In continuation of this particular point of the argument on the employment of floating means of defence when fixed means are practicable, I may quote the opinion of Major Parnell, R.E., an officer who has given considerable attention to the question of coast fortification: "There is only one species of coast defence battery less efficient than a battery à fleur d'eau, and that is a floating battery. In batteries of this kind the acme of inefficiency is reached. They involve a maximum of expense with a minimum of usefulness. In employing them, you deliberately throw away all the natural advantages belonging to shore batteries, aud you put yourself on a level, both figuratively and literally, with your adversary. You pay heavily for so doing, and you gain no single benefit in return, for mobility is quite an unnecessary element in coast batteries.
9. Ships are liable to be sunk, whereas forts are free from such a mishap. Double bottoms, watertight compartments, and such like means of keeping an injured vessel afloat, are excellent in theory, but unfortunately do not always succeed in practice. Iron-clad ships will, if seriously injured, insist upon sinking, whilst with smaller vessels and gun-boats no system of compartments will insure their safety against the damage inflicted on them by a successful torpedo, active or passive, It may here be remarked that improvements in modern ordnance and machines of war generally are every day
* Inclosure 15 in No. 74.
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