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Appendix No. 4. at present, and can be supplemented should the future commercial prosperity of the port render it
advisable. CEYLON.
upon.
The plans for the defence cannot be completed until the plan of the breakwater is finally decided
Should it be decided to move the naval head-quarters to Colombo, land will be required for the erection of suitable stores.
The torpedo-stores at Trincomalee will become available for Colombo.
It may not be out of place to point out that the projectile, weighing 404 lbs., from the 10-inch guns recommended, would pierce the side of a ship like the Russian man-of-war" Minim," plated with 8-inch armour, at 2,500 yards; the heaviest gun carried by the "Minim" is an 8-inch, of which she has four.
Galle.
Until the result of the new harbour at Colombo is ascertained, it would not be advisable to expend much at Galle. Should, however, the ships for China and the East still continue to make use of it as a coaling station, it may be necessary to give it some further protection; the formation of a battery on Watering Point, and strengthening and re-arming the seaward bastions, would, I think, be sufficient. I am of opinion that, in the event of war, all ships could coal at Colombo, and it will, therefore, not be necessary to do anything at Galle.
There are no local levies at Galle.
Trincomalee.
Trincomalee, as I have pointed out, can only be useful as a port for Her Majesty's navy, and I am of opinion that the question should be submitted to the highest naval authorities whether it will be necessary to hold the place or not. If it is to be held it can only be done at a very large expenditure, and will entail a very considerable garrison being employed.
No assistance whatever can be expected from local levies.
The movements of the navy should not be in any way fettered by having to aid in the defence of the port. If one ship is detained the harbour becomes a source of weakness, and not of strength.
To hold the place, it must be looked upon as a fortress, and as such, hardly comes under the cognizance of the Commission, who are practically limited to the recommendation of small works and small garrisons.
The plan proposed by Major Nugent* appears very suitable; but, in view of the expense that it would entail, I should prefer for the present not to occupy Elephant Ridge, but to be content with holding the Ostenburgh Ridge, and forming an additional battery either on Little Sober Island or on the bluff on Great Sober Island. For this purpose Little Sober Island has some advantages, as it can see both in and out of the harbour. It is, however, limited in extent. There certainly would be undefended water outside Elephant Ridge, but it would do little harm, as no shell-fire from there could touch the dockyard; that lies securely under Ostenburgh Ridge. The estimates would be reduced by the amount required for Elephant Ridge.
There would be an addition for the battery on Little Sober Island; the armament, two 10-inch guns, would cost about 7,000. This includes the supply of 300 rounds ammunition per gun.
A large garrison would be required, and I do not see that the garrison proposed by Major Nugent could be reduced, even with the less extended plan of fortification.
A defensible barrack would have to be built on Ostenburgh Ridge, near the dockyard.
Should it not be considered necessary to hold Trincomalee, an enemy might be prevented from making use of the harbour by mounting heavy guns at Fort Ostenburgh, able to see both in and out of the harbour.
A small garrison in this case would suffice.
I have touched very little on the subject of estimates, as they would be prepared by the Commanding Royal Engineer.
Colombo, October 10, 1881.
(Signed)
G. J. SMART, Colonel Commanding Royal Artillery, Ceylon.
No. 58.
War Office Memorandum on the Defence of Ceylon.
CEYLON, lying immediately between Aden and Singapore, occupies a very important position in the route, viâ the Suez Canal, to China and Australia; it commands also the Bay of Bengal and the approach to Calcutta by all routes.
Its importance is both strategical and commercial; strategical not only as one in the chain of military posts which serve to link Great Britain to her dependencies in the East, but as a central position for the collection and distribution of reinforcements to India, China, and the East; commercial as the point of junction of all the main lines of steam communication in the East, where large stocks of coal are maintained, and where the vast streams of commerce flowing east and west meet.
In considering what shall be done for Ceylon, three ports force themselves on our attention, and we are at once confronted with the difficulty of selection.
1. The naval port and yard at Trincomalee, where there is a splendid harbour, which is indeed the only natural harbour in the island, but which lies 300 miles out of the trade
routes.
* See No. 58.
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