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advantages offered by Colombo, ships for China and the East, not having cargo for Ceylon, will still Appendix No 4. continue to use Galle as a coaling station.
CEYLON.
Trincomalee.
Trincomalee is the station for Her Majesty's navy, and possesses a magnificent harbour. There is a small naval yard, hospital, and house for the Admiral; munitions of war are also kept there for the navy. This harbour, unfortunately, lies so far out of the line of all trade that it may be looked upon as useless for any commercial purposes. It is cut off from the rest of the island by about 60 miles of jungle, and has no resources of any sort. It becomes a question whether it is advisable to keep up a naval establishment there or not, and this is, I think, a question for higher naval authorities at home to decide. It certainly is an Imperial question, as Trincomalee can never be of any service to Ceylon as a port.
Trincomalee would make a port of refuge and refitting, for which it has several natural advantages. It possesses a safe and commodious shelter for war-vessels, is easy of access, and capable of defence; but it has also several disadvantages. It is far removed from the line of commerce, and of vessels passing and repassing. It has no resources, and the position there being extended would require very great expense to fortify, and when fortified would require a very much larger garrison than could be spared for its defence. Before it could be looked upon as a port of refuge and refitting a very large outlay would be required for docks, and, if the means for the repair of machinery are to be kept there, a still larger outlay is indispensable. All stores and provisions have to be imported, and then kept in a climate where they are specially liable to deteriorate.
Ships lying there would be shut up in a harbour, far removed from any sphere of activity or usefulness.
Trincomalee makes a pleasant harbour for the navy to lie in, but it is doubtful whether, in the present day, it is required as a naval strategical position.
The splendid harbour of Bombay, and all the resources that it commands, in the north, and a port of refuge and refitting in Australia, in the south, should be sufficient for the Eastern Seas. Vessels of the navy calling at Ceylon could utilize the harbour at Colombo, where they could take in coal, stores, and munitions of war, and take advantage of such resources as there are in Ceylon.
If it is necessary that Trincomalee should be occupied as a naval strategical position and port of refuge and refitting, it should be made secure at any expense; if it is not necessary, it is absurd to incur the expense to defend a useless harbour.
Questions 3, 4, and 5 really embody the system of defence for each place. I have endeavoured to show that Colombo is the principal port to be defended, and have also pointed out that it has no natural defensive position; defend it as you will, it will still be exposed to shell-fire. The plan proposed by Major Nugent, which is the present defence with the addition of a battery at Mutwal, which has been recommended by the Commanding Royal Engineer, is the only plan that can be adopted, and the substitution of the heavier guns in place of those now mounted is absolutely necessary.
As there is only one gun at Battenburgh bastion that can fire across the proposed entrance to the harbour, I would increase the battery at that point. There will be room to make the addition on the right, or harbour side, of the present battery, but it cannot be commenced until the breakwater is completed, on account of the railway from the contractor's yard. Should this arrangement be carried out, I would make the battery consist of three 10-inch and two 9-inch guns. There will then be three 10-inch guns on each side of the harbour, viz., from Battenburgh and Mutwal, which will fire over the entrance, and command the surrounding water. The extra expense of the armament would be about 9,000%.
The emplacements at Battenburgh are very open, and the battery lies low. Considering the importance of the work, it is not perhaps too much to suggest that the battery should be shield-plated, or otherwise extra protected.
The work would include the site at present occupied by the breakwater engineer. The proposed armament for Colombo would be as under:-
Mutwal Point: three 10-inch guns; two 64-pounder guns.
Battenburgh Bastion: one 10-inch gun; two 9-inch guns.
To be added after completion of breakwater: two 10-inch guns.
Enkhuyzen one 9-inch gun.
Guard Battery: one 9-inch gun; two 64-pounders, or 7-inch guns.
Klippenburgh: one 9-inch gun.
With the exception of artillery, the present garrison and that of Kandy would be sufficient, and considerable assistance may be expected from local levies and the police. To man the guns would take about 250 men, of whom one-third at least might be infantry. For general purposes there would be the remainder of the infantry, say 400, and the volunteers, 500; two strong companies could be furnished by the police.
The present strength of artillery at Colombo is about 60, and 40 gun lascars. A great portion of the infantry are exercised at gun-drill.
There is no company of volunteer artillery, but the volunteer movement has only recently com- menced at Colombo, and an artillery company may yet be formed, or, at all events, the European company of the volunteers may be exercised at gun-drill.
It is not probable that Colombo would be attacked on the land side: if so, the attack could be repulsed by the garrison, aided by the field-guns. A 7-pounder battery is kept packed and equipped
at the station.
The above measures for the defence of Colombo are not complete, but are as much as is necessary
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* No. 58.
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