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The necessary magazine and barrack accommodation may, as before stated, be con- structed on suitable sites in rear of Gravel Hill out of fire.
If the foregoing works are approved of, a garrison of 600 should suffice, being distributed as per margin; additional barracks would have to be constructed at Fort Frederick (where there is an excellent site) for what may be considered the reserve force
for the station.
Appendix No 4.
Fort Frederick
CEYLON. Garrison.
Great Sober Island For Ostenburgh
103
Men.
300
250
50
Total
600
•
New Barracks required.
£
Fort Frederick, for 200 men.. Great Sober Island, for 250
20,000
men..
25,000
Total
45,000
I consider the occupation of Orr's Hill unnecessary if Fort Frederick is strengthened as proposed on land side, or, at any rate, a post there is of minor importance.
Orr's Hill.
£
(Signed)
Colombo, Ceylon, October 24, 1881.
RICHARD WARREN, Colonel,
Commanding Royal Engineer in Ceylon.
Battery Armament
1,000 600
Total
1,600
Inclosure 5 in No. 57.
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Memorandum by Colonel Warren, Commanding Royal Engineers, on Defences of Ostenburgh Peninsula by a limited Garrison, with a view to resist the attack of a Cruizer or small Squadron, and thus deny the use of the Harbour of Trincomalee to an Enemy.
IT having been decided by a majority of the Committee assembled by his Excellency the Governor to report on the defences of Ceylon to suggest "for consideration," in reference to Trincomalee, the construction of a "small but strongly defensive work on Fort Ostenburgh, such as would, with the aid of torpedoes, make the entrance to the harbour difficult to an enemy's cruizer, and render it impossible for that cruizer to remain there, the extent of the defences to be limited within the capabilities of a force consisting of 1 battery of artillery, 50 men trained for torpedo purposes, and 2 companies of infantry to man the works," I have been requested to draw up a Memorandum on the project.
Having already submitted a Memorandum* on the general question of the defences of the ports of Colombo, Galle, and Trincomalee, and stated my views fully as regards the harbour of Trincomalee, viz., that if it be considered desirable to maintain and augment the existing Imperial naval establishment and to construct docks, &c., the port will assume such a degree of importance as would justify a large expenditure on fortifications, to render it perfectly secure from attack by sea or by land, or both combined, and with this view having suggested the occupation of Great Sober Island for the reasons given, part of the scheme being the dismantling of Fort Ostenburgh, on the grounds that it is considered unsafe, uselessly small, and incapable of holding a sufficient garrison to defend itself, and being productive of danger in the hands of an enemy, I cannot concur in the suggestion of the Committee to put forward, even "for consideration," such a project as the occupation of the Ostenburgh peninsula alone, with a very limited garrison, entirely unsupported by Fort Frederick, which it is proposed to dismantle, "no troops being available for holding it."
I consider the Ostenburgh position untenable without the support of Fort Frederick on the land side; indeed, Fort Frederick must form an important part of any scheme for the defence of the harbour of Trincomalee, as it commands both Dutch and Back Bays and the approaches on the land side from the direction of Nellavilly, where an enemy might effect a landing under favourable circumstances, and advance some 8 miles over an excellent road to co-operate with an attack on the entrance to the harbour.
This mode of attack was adopted when we took Trincomalee from the Dutch in 1797. If Fort Frederick fell into the hands of an enemy, the Ostenburgh position, especially the neighbourhood of Puget's Wharf, could be shelled from Dutch Bay and all supplies would be cut off, and Fort Ostenburgh would soon fall, and, with it, all control of the submarine mines being lost, the harbour would be lost. It was for this reason that, in my former Memorandum, I advocated the strengthening of Fort Frederick, and particularly Zieburgh and Amsterdam bastions on the land side.
But with reference to the project now under consideration, it must be remembered that Fort Frederick is an extensive work, in good condition, possessing valuable barracks, stores, magazines, &c., and that there are excellent sites for additional barracks, whereas the state of things on the Ostenburgh peninsula is the very reverse.
Fort Ostenburgh Garrison.
Artillery, 1 battery; infantry, 2 com- panies; Royal Engineers, small de- tachment; gun lascars, ditto; native boatmen, 50.
I repeat, therefore, the opinion I have before expressed, that if Trincomalee is of suffi- cient importance to the Imperial Government to be worth defending, it would be a great See Sketch (not printed). mistake to adopt any half measures. Far better abandon the station altogether.
Having said thus much I proceed to state the best means I can suggest for the defence
of Fort Ostenburgh, under the conditions laid down, before referred to.
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# Inclosure 4 in No. 57.
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