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SIERRA LEONE.
The
Appendix No. 4. point is low, being only 6 to 8 feet above high-water mark. The fort proposed by the Inspector-
General of Fortifications is admirably adapted to the needs of the defence of this point. Committee recommend that the 10-inch gun proposed to be mounted en barbette be on the left flank, with lateral range, so as to thoroughly command the whole of Congo Town Creek, which lies to the west of King Tom's Point.
Look-out Point. The Committee strongly recommend the abandonment of this point as the site for a fort for the following reasons :--
1. The ground on the headland to the west of Look-out Point (Aberdeen Hill), is so high that vessels approaching the harbour from the westward would be entirely masked from the fire of Look-out Battery, until they had actually entered the river.
2. The small bay between Aberdeen Hill and Cape Sierra Leone (Cape Bay) affords good holding ground and landing-places. Large boats or even gun-boats could lie there under cover of the hill, land guns and men, and establish a battery on the crest of Aberdeen Hill, which would entirely command Look-out Point Battery, and could render it untenable.
3. There is a sandy beach affording easy landing all along the shore southwards from Cape Sierra Leone, the water being deep enough to allow medium-sized vessels to lie within half-a-mile of the shore, where they could not be seen from Look-out Point, which would be peculiarly liable to attack in rear from a force landed under cover of the ship's guns.
Fort Aberdeen (proposed).--In lieu of this position the Committee recommend that a similar fort to that proposed for Look-out Point Battery should be erected on Aberdeen Hill, except that the number of 64-pounders in the armament be increased from four to six.
Fort Aberdeen would cover the whole entrance to the river, and from its superior command could fire over Cape Sierra Leone, and engage the enemy before entering the stream. Its guns would rake the whole shore trending southward, and its 64-pounders would sweep the low-lying lands between the fort and Signal Hill, and thus reduce to a minimum the possibility of a hostile force landing and attacking the town in flank from this direction. The approaches to Signal Hill are so precipitous that a body of men landed at the Cape, the landing-place there being under cover from both Signal Hill and Look-out Battery, could easily by a short rush get under cover from the fire of any work on Signal Hill, and would then have the way to the town open to them. It is not too much to say that to leave Aberdeen Hill undefended would be to destroy the completeness of the whole system of defence by inviting a land attack, and also by making the approach from the sea comparatively easy. The armament for this fort would be four 10-inch guns en barbette, one of which should be in a salient bearing due south, and six 64-pounders, two bearing on Cape Sierra Leone, two on Pirate Bay and Aberdeen Creek, and two with a lateral range from Signal Hill to the 5-fathom line along the shore. Fort Aberdeen, the first to engage an enemy, would thus form a bulwark which none but a very powerful foe could attack, and which no foe, however powerful, could afford to despise.
To render the system of sea defences complete it might be advisable to erect a small battery at Look-out Point, but it would add much to the estimated expense, and the system as at present proposed is sufficiently strong to prevent the approach of any force which even the strongest Power would be likely to devote to the attack of Sierra Leone.
Land Defences.
Freetown is open to attack on three sides by land, viz. :—
1. On the west by a force landed on the coast of the peninsula, and advancing on the town by a road from Aberdeen and Wilberforce;
2. On the south, by a force landed as above, and approaching the town by bush paths converging on the road from Leicester Mountain.
3. On the east by a force landed either on the Bullom shore and crossing the river high up, or from ships which have succeeded in running past the town and anchoring up the river out of range of the town batteries. This force would march on the town from the direction of Kissy.
Wilberforce.—To render (1) secure, it would be necessary to erect a small work armed with medium guns on the high land south of the village of Wilberforce. A tolerably strong earthwork, armed with three 64-pounders, mounted en barbette, and firing west and south, would be sufficient. Quarters for a detachment of twenty men should be provided in this work, to take charge of the guns and ammunition which it would be necessary to keep on the spot. To secure the road from the coast leading round the north of Signal Hill, from a force landed under cover of night and making a rush for the town, it would be necessary to mount two 64-pounders on Signal Hill, protected by a slight breastwork only, as the precipitous nature of Signal Hill effectually protects it from danger of assault. And as this position lies so directly below Wilberforce that it would be totally untenable should the latter be in the hands of the enemy, it is not therefore necessary to go to any expense except for the erection of the necessary magazines and stores. At both this place and Wilberforce it would be necessary to provide storage for water, as the springs from which the village of Wilberforce is supplied lie at some distance, and at a lower level.
The position of Signal Hill is a valuable one, as it entirely dominates the road by which any force attacking the town would most probably advance, and in conjunction with Fort Aberdeen and Wilberforce Redoubt, would sweep the beach at the points most favourable for landing, and completely protect the adjacent low-lying lands and the roads converging on the town.
Leicester Lines. The approaches to the town from the south (2) are difficult for an invading force, as a body of men landing on the peninsula out of sight and range of the works mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and wishing to advance by the Leicester Road and heights, would have to cross a difficult range of hills, which are practicable only by steep, narrow, and overgrown bush paths; and the Committee are not of opinion that an attack in any force need be anticipated from that quarter.
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