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cause greater delay than an enemy would, under ordinary circumstances, care to submit to. An expenditure of about 30,000l. would, in Sir Lintorn Simmons' opinion, in most cases, cover the cost of the work and of the barrack for its garrison about 150 strong. The Admiralty will have to decide
at which stations it is essential that coal should be kept. In our Appendix See Appendix No. 1. will be found a paper by Sir Alexander Milne, giving a list of the coaling- stations now in use by your Majesty's navy, and those which would, in his opinion, be essential in time of war.
152. A point of great importance has been frequently before us, namely, the stock of coal kept for mercantile purposes at stations which are unde- fended. We think that your Majesty's Government should lose no oppor- tunity of making such arrangements that in the event of war the coal shall be immediately destroyed or removed, and should keep themselves always informed of the amount of coal in store at each undefended station. Unless provision be made for such contingencies, and a definite plan of action prearranged conjointly between the Colonial, Naval, and Military Departments of your Majesty's service and the various Colonial Governments, it is not improbable, considering the vast extent of the Empire, that many useful precautions may be overlooked, and many steps conducive to public safety postponed to so late a period as to be difficult, if not impossible, of adoption in the event of a sudden outbreak of maritime war.
153. Not until the important coaling-stations shall have been made secure can the strength of the British navy be adequately exerted at sea. When, however, this has been accomplished, no other Power will possess equal facilities for keeping fleets at sea, or equally good lines of com- munications.
154. Leaving out of consideration the route to the East by the Suez Canal as liable to interruption, Gibraltar and Sierra Leone, with such assistance as can be derived from St. Helena, will, when defended, put your Majesty's fleet in the best position for protecting the line of trade from the United Kingdom to the Cape of Good Hope. Beyond the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, Singapore, Aden, and the large Australian ports, in conjunction with Colombo and the Indian ports, will support your Majesty's ships, will make the Indian Ocean difficult of access to hostile ships, and will so far secure British trade and British possessions within that ocean. Hong Kong will enable the fleet to act with effect in the China Sea, and will do much to secure our China trade. Additional security will be given north of Hong Kong, if it be found practicable to give effect to our recommendations as to Port Hamilton. Jamaica and St. Lucia will enable your Majesty's ships to guard the West Indian Colonies and their trade, while Bermuda and Halifax will support them in protecting trade in the North Atlantic. The Australian Colonies-growing rapidly in wealth and population-are year by year, by their own efforts, becoming more able to resist hostile attack, and to assist in the common defence of the Empire.
155. It appears to us that direct communication should be kept up by British vessels with all the important parts of your Majesty's Empire. For instance, it seems inexpedient that Mauritius, the white population of which is chiefly of French extraction, should communicate with England only through a French channel. A line of steamers carrying both passengers and mails, and a direct line of telegraph, is not only important from a military point of view, but must exercise a great and probably an assimilating influence upon the relations of any two peoples.
any
156. We have not thought it our duty to recommend the construction of docks or similar works. We have observed in the course of our inquiry that private Companies are constructing or are contemplating the construc- tion of commercial docks at several important colonial ports, which might, at small increase of cost, be made available for the largest ships in your Majesty's navy. It may not be out of place to call the attention of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to these cases, in some of which an Imperial contribution on certain conditions might secure valuable accommodation for your Majesty's ships.
157. It is difficult to provide a sufficient force of British troops for gar- risons abroad. In some of the Colonies and foreign stations, as, for instance,
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