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Third Report, p. 451.
Paragraph 127.
Digest, p. 623.
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would certainly be interrupted in the event of war. It must not be for- gotten, too, that the population of Vancouver Island is to a great extent either American or connected with the people of the United States by family and other ties.
130. (b.) Assuming the neutrality of the United States, Russian ships might approach within sight of Esquimalt in neutral waters, and could obtain a supply of coal sufficient to take them to their nearest home port, if the United States adopted a rule similar to that adopted by this country in the war between the Northern and Southern States. Thus, a Russian attack might be of such a nature as to require strong defences and a large permanent garrison. It must, however, be remembered that, with the exception of the naval arsenal, there is little in British Columbia to attract a Russian squadron. The trade of the province is small, and would, in the event of war, follow the land instead of the sea route. The towns on the coast, such as Victoria, New Westminster, and Port Simpson, whatever they may be destined in future to become, are at present comparatively unimportant.
131. If a British squadron is to be maintained on the western seaboard of America, Esquimalt must be fortified. Until the defences are adequate, at least, to meet the attack of a squadron, Esquimalt cannot be pronounced to be a safe coaling and refitting station. The Pacific Squadron cannot be kept permanently at Esquimalt for the defence of the harbour, and it must be remembered that the destruction of the stores and munitions would place your Majesty's ships in a position of extreme danger, with no help nearer than Hong Kong, distant 5,700 miles.
132. The defence of Esquimalt would cost, according to Colonel Cross- man's estimate, 194,500l., and require a garrison of 1,300 regular troops, which would have to be maintained at all times at war strength, as it could not possibly be reinforced within the short period that would elapse between a declaration of war and an attack. But these defences, considerable as they are, would not secure the place against the United States. Even a first-class fortress, supported by a powerful squadron, could not hold out for long.
133. We have pointed out how limited and ineffectual would be the action of the Pacific Squadron based upon Esquimalt, and also that the coaling- stations between Vancouver Island and Cape Horn are in foreign territory, and, therefore, available to us in time of war only to the limited extent above pointed out in the case of Rnssian ships. We fail to see how your Majesty's ships, when deprived of a supply of coals, could continue active operations on the western seaboard of America, and we think it matter for grave con- sideration whether the squadron would not be of more service for the pro- tection of British interests in the Pacific if employed to reinforce the China Station. In that event, the present naval establishment at Esquimalt might be dispensed with. It does not follow from this that British interests on this coast need be neglected. We consider that visits by a flying squadron, or occasional cruizers, would afford as efficacious protection as that now in fact given by the Pacific Squadron. The changes which we recommend are a transfer and redistribution of our naval power, rather than a dimi- nution of our force in the Pacific.
134. If hereafter, when the Canadian Pacific Railway is constructed, trade should increase, towns spring up, and population multiply, Vancouver Island and Esquimalt may assume an importance in which at this moment they are wanting. The arguments against the fortification of Esquimalt are justified by existing circumstances, but it is conceivable that at a future day events and changes, now impossible to foresee, might render the construction of fortifications expedient.
135. Such, then, being the case, we have come to the conclusion that, from a military point of view, and in the present stage of commercial development of the province, it would be inexpedient to construct powerful works of defence at Esquimalt, and to establish a large garrison. In the event of hostilities with the United States, it is our plain duty to your Majesty to declare that Esquimalt could not be defended, and that in the event of hostilities with any other Power, there would probably be little fear of molestation if there were neither ships, works, nor stores to tempt attack.
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