Page 263

Page 263

4

done. The arms, in the event of the outbreak of the then anticipated war, were necessary at any cost, and the question of who was to supply them was altogether secondary, but now that the immediate risk has passed, it will be well to consider, as a whole, the measures that should be taken for the defence, not only of the West India Islands, but of all our Colonies.

Garrisons of Her Majesty's regular army being out of the question in the event of an European war, except at important strategical points, it would be well in the first instance to determine what those points are, and how they are to be defended; to what extent naval means may be relied on, and what local means should be provided, including

1. Works of defence and submarine mines.

2. Armaments.

3. Garrisons, whether Imperial or local forces, or the two combined.

4. Auxiliary gun-boats.

5. Torpedo-boats.

6. Arms and equipment of local forces.

Having decided these points, the incidence of their cost will have to be determined, whether it is to be defrayed entirely from Imperial funds or partly from Colonial funds.

The defence of the principal strategical positions being settled, that of the other important ports in the Colonies and of the Colonies themselves against foreign attack will have to be considered under the same heads in each case, with reference to the means available in the Colony, to its population, and to its local institutions.

Unless under exceptional circumstances, such as now exist at the Cape of Good Hope, it is presumed that the Colonies should provide for their internal security against disorderly or disaffected populations, in which case it is not improbable that the garrisons of the regular army might be withdrawn from some stations and concentrated in the more important strategical positions, where, while providing for their defence during war, they might be available, by the aid of telegraphs and steam, as reserves in support of the civil power in the event of internal commotion during peace in any neighbouring Colony.

It is not improbable, considering the vast development of steam power for naval purposes and of artillery of late years, and the consequent revolution in the operations of war, that in determining the positions which for strategical purposes it is necessary to maintain, one or more of those now occupied may cease to be regarded as such, and others take their place, but there can be no doubt that the apprehensions caused by the supposed imminence of war previous to the signing of the Treaty of Berlin have clearly demonstrated what had been frequently urged on the late Government as well as on the present-viz., that in the absence of such positions provided with adequate means for their defence, the operations of Her Majesty's fleets for the protection of the vast interests of Great Britain, commercial as well as political, all over the world, might possibly have been greatly embarrassed, if not crippled, even by a few cruizers handled with activity and energy, which, without any reflection upon the sagacity or efficiency of Her Majesty's navy, might have escaped from an enemy's ports or been fitted out surreptitiously by him elsewhere.

It is essential that stores of coal should be kept for the use of Her Majesty's ships in convenient and secure harbours, as also that they should have the means of filling up with coals, refitting and repairing damages in security, without which there can be no certainty that they will be able to keep the sea and afford that protection to British commerce and the Colonies which they have a right to expect from them, and it may be predicted with certainty that after everything has been done that can be done to supply their needs, their duties will even then be most arduous, and task their energies to the utmost.

Ports also in the Colonies, in which large supplies of coal are kept for commercial purposes, if undefended, may become a source of considerable danger by the possibility they might afford to an enemy of obtaining supplies of coal. The defence of such ports then is of consequence, not only directly for their own protection, but indirectly for that of other places.

If, however, the navy is kept on such a footing in war, both as regards ships and means for coaling, that the operations of large hostile squadrons may be effectually prevented, an amount of protection will thereby be afforded to the Colonies against external attack at the expense of the mother country, which will reduce their defence to such as in most instances will be within the power of the Colonies themselves, if duly organized in peace before the outbreak of war, and it will be for decision whether they should undertake such limited defence entirely at their own charges, as has been done in some of the Australian Colonies, or whether the Home Government should afford some encouragement by aiding in one or more of the following methods: in the construction of

Page 263

Page 263

Page 263

Share This Page