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in the case of any particular Scheme, the risk of essential details being obscured by the inclusion of matter which, although of great importance in the case of some other Defence Scheme, may be of comparatively no interest in the case of the Scheme in question.
For these reasons the proposed arrangement has been shown by experience to be that best suited to the case of a large area like the Commonwealth
6. As regards the general Scheme for the defence of the Commonwealth. It is suggested that, in addition to recording the arrangements for the allotment of troops to the coast defences, the field army and the expeditionary force, as proposed in the despatch of the Governor-General, the Scheme should include a detailed record of the action to be taken in time of emergency by every civil, naval, and military official at the seat of Government: and in this connection the Oversea Defence Committee venture to call attention to their Memorandum No. 455 M, dated the 30th December, 1912, on Notification of Preparations for War, wherein they describe the general procedure that has been adhered to in the compilation of general and other war books in the United Kingdom. The general war book of the Commonwealth Government might conveniently form part of the general Commonwealth Defence Scheme.
7. The Governor-General states that the Commonwealth Government have decided to mount two 9-2-inch guns for the defence of Sydney, and that the question of the selection of sites for these guns is now under consideration. Although for the reasons stated in the Oversea Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 438 M, dated the 26th May, 1911, on the Standard of Armament at Defended Ports in Australia, there may be no urgent necessity at the present time for the provision of these guns, yet, in view of the increased importance of Sydney, due to the growth of the Royal Australian Navy, the Committee are of opinion that the decision of the Commonwealth Government is fully justified.
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8. The enclosure to the Governor-General's despatch of the 14th August, 1912, printed in the Appendix to this Memorandum, describes the strategical considerations on which the details of the Commonwealth Defence Scheme are being based. The contents of the memorandum show that the general principles that must be borne in mind in estimating the military needs of Australia at the present time have been correctly appreciated, and the memorandum in its main outline is concurred in by the Oversea Defence Committee.
9. It is observed that, in discussing the probability of a raiding attack against Australia, it is stated :—
"The probability of such raids being undertaken will vary inversely as the strength and efficiency of the local naval and military forces maintained in Australia. Upon an estimate of such strength and efficiency will an enemy determine whether the probable result of an attempt by a raiding force to effect serious damage before being destroyed or compelled to surrender would be commensurate with the risks incurred in the enterprise."
It would appear, therefore, to be assumed that a raiding force against Australia must in all circumstances be ultimately destroyed or compelled to surrender.
10. It is true that in paragraph 12 of their Memorandum No. 442 M, dated the 3rd May, 1911, on the Strategic Situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined, the Oversea Defence Committee referred to the destruction and surrender of such a force. The Committee did not, however, intend to imply that the force would necessarily be destroyed or compelled to surrender, for it is conceivable that in certain circumstances a raiding force might be able to withdraw even though it might have suffered serious losses.
11. It is suggested therefore that, in discussing the probability of a raiding attack on Australia, it should be made clear that this is so, or else that all reference to the destruction or surrender of the force might be omitted.
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