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5. The next task for the Sub-Committee was to ascertain to what extent these reasons still hold good.
New Factors in the Naval Situation.
6. The following new factors affecting the naval situation, which have arisen since 1908, were brought to the notice of the Sub-Committee by the representatives of the Admiralty :—
7. First, the strength of the British fleet relative to the second fleet of the world, which is now the German fleet, is less than it was in 1908. Consequently a larger proportion of our war-ships will be required at the outset of a war in the main theatre of operations, and fewer can be spared for the local protection of trade routes.
8. Secondly, the number of armed vessels engaged in attacking our trade routes is likely to be very much larger than was anticipated in 1908, owing to the fact that many German merchant ships are now fitted as armed auxiliaries, and carry their armaments on board at all times. In 1908 the only attacks on our trade routes which were apprehended by the Admiralty were by some few cruisers which might have succeeded in eluding the vigilance of our fleets. Those which were in the enemy's ports on the outbreak of war would have had to pass through narrow waters swarming with British vessels in order to reach the open ocean, where their operations would alone have a reasonable prospect of success. The position of war-ships outside the narrow seas was at all times known to the Admiralty in time of peace, and it was hoped to put an end to their activities very shortly after the outbreak of war.
9. The arming of German merchant vessels has, however, so considerably increased the number of potential commerce destroyers likely to be on the trade routes at the outbreak of war that complete local protection to the trade routes at that time by means of British cruisers could only be provided at a prohibitive
expense.
10. A third factor in the situation is the development of wireless telegraphy, which tends to facilitate concerted action by British war vessels in the pursuit of commerce destroyers, as well as the issue of warnings to British shipping when danger threatens in any particular area. It also enables an enemy to warn his national shipping at sea that war has broken out, and that the moment has arrived for mounting guns and operating against British commerce.
11. A fourth factor in the naval situation, which is bound, in the opinion of the Admiralty, to exercise great influence in the near future, is the application of liquid fuel and the internal combustion engine to the propulsion of vessels. Under the conditions obtaining up to the present time, the activities of commerce destroyers were likely to be hampered by the difficulty of obtaining coal. Given favourable weather, they might for a time rely on supplies of coal taken from their prizes, or otherwise obtained at sea. Sooner or later, however, they would be obliged to put into port for coal. Thus their position would become known to our cruisers, and their prospects of continuing to elude pursuit would be diminished.
12. The imminent introduction of oil fuel and internal combustion engines in merchant vessels promises to remove this handicap on commerce destroyers. Experi- mental vessels are already at sea which carry fuel for a voyage from northern Europe to Singapore and back without replenishing supplies. At present, it is true, there are probably no German vessels propelled by internal combustion engines which actually carry guns in their holds, but there is reason to suppose that this will be the case in a few years time. Like the "Alabama," which was a sailing-vessel fitted with auxiliary steam, they will be independent of shore facilities for long periods, and for this reason, like her, they will be able to remain out of sight of land for long periods, and it will be difficult to bring them to action owing to the uncertainty of their precise where- abouts.
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