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SECRET.
NOTE BY THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.
THE fortifications of Flushing may be considered from two points of view-the offensive and the defensive.
1. The situation of Flushing, some 90 miles east of the North Foreland and at the mouth of the Scheldt, is one of extreme importance in the event of our being engaged in war with a first-class maritime Power, whose fleets could use that port as a fortified hase for operations directed against us.
Such use could only take place with the consent, forced or willing, of the Netherlands, but circumstances seem to show that this contingency is by no means improbable, and that in the event of war with Germany we might find Flushing converted into a German Naval base. The fact that the mouths of the Rhine, a German river, navigable by small vessels as far as German territory, connect with the mouths of the Scheldt emphasises the importance of Flushing in this connection.
It is recognised by the General Staff that this question of the offensive value of Flushing is mainly a Naval one, and they do not therefore propose to discuss it here. They desire, however, to point out that the fortification by the Dutch of Flushing, a Dutch port, is not open to objection by us or any other Power on the score of its possible use as a base for offensive action oversea, nor does there appear to be anything in such fortification incompatible with the obligations of Dutch neutrality.
2. The defensive capabilities of Flushing open up quite another question, the consideration of which appears at first to be complicated by the position of that port relative to the Belgian port and fortress of Antwerp.
The Scheldt, which is easily navigable by large vessels as far as Antwerp, some 50 miles from its mouth, runs for the last 35 miles of its course to the sea through Dutch territory, and thus we have presented the curious anomaly of a Belgian seaport situated a few miles up a Dutch river, above a Dutch port which is placed at the mouth of that river.
The one port can only be reached from the sea by passing the other, and Flushing is therefore the outwork or gateway of Antwerp, and can effectually bar access to or from the Belgian port by means of the Scheldt.
As Antwerp is not only a considerable seaport, but is also a strongly fortified place of arms which would constitute a favourable base for a British or other foreign force landed to co-operate with the Belgians in the protection of their neutrality, this fact, that a fortified Flushing may neutralise Antwerp as a port or base, appears at first sight to be one of great importance.
A closer examination of the matter shows, however, that the importance of Flushing in this respect may easily be exaggerated, and that the real question is not whether Flushing should be fortified or not, but whether Holland is friendly or not to Belgian interests and the preservation of Belgian neutrality.
An unfriendly Holland can effectually prevent access to Antwerp from the sea by the Scheldt, whether Flushing is fortified or not, for it would appear that no Navy, however powerful, would be likely to attempt to force the narrow waters of the Dutch Scheldt as far as the Belgian frontier in the face of a hostile Holland.
It is believed that mines, torpedoes, guns, and improvised defences would be sufficient to prevent the ascent of the Scheldt as far as Antwerp, even were Flushing left undefended.
On the other hand, were Holland friendly to Belgium and disposed to permit the ascent of the Dutch portion of the river, the fortification of Flushing would lose all significance.
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